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INTRODUCTION
“I [was] . . . the equal of the gods, save only [t]hat I must die.”
–Euripides1
Federal administrative law judges (“ALJs”) understand 
Euripides’s irony all too well.2 They, along with Article I judges, are 
+Reprinted with permission of the Vanderbilt Law Review, at 66 VAND.
L. REV. 797 (2013).
*Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. I appreciate 
the helpful comments from Ian Ayres, Rachel Barkow, Dan Coenen, Jacob Gersen, 
Tara Leigh Grove, Matt Hall, Michael Healy, Jeffrey Lubbers, Tuan Samahon, 
Michael Sant’Ambrogio, David Shipley, Mark Tushnet, Chris Walker, Adam 
Zimmerman, and participants at the 2012 Yale-Stanford-Harvard Junior Faculty 
Forum, the 2012 Junior Faculty Federal Courts Forum, and the University of 
Georgia and the University of Kentucky law-faculty workshops. I also appreciate 
the gracious assistance of the editorial staff at the VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW. An 
earlier draft of this Article was cited in JOHN M. ROGERS, MICHAEL P. HEALY &
RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 460 (3d ed. 2012).
1 EURIPIDES, HECUBA 33 (tran. line 341–44) (John Harrison ed. & trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2008) (quoting Princess Polyxena’s speech, delivered 
before she is sacrificed).
2 ALJs have successfully lobbied for more prestigious titles, evolving 
from mere “examiners,” to “hearing examiners,” to “administrative law judges.”
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible 
Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 110 n.8 (1981); see also K.G. Jan Pillai, 
Rethinking Judicial Immunity for the Twenty-First Century, 39 HOW. L.J. 95, 123 
(1995):
Naturally, the ALJs would like to think of themselves as judges 
or the functional equivalent of federal judges. In 1972, they 
persuaded the Civil Service Commission (now the OPM) to 
change their title from ‘hearing examiner’ to ‘administrative law 
judge’ for the purpose of enhancing their public image and 
prestige. 
 
Yet, they are commonly referred to as ALJs, a designation that arguably diminishes 
their judicial status. They are not amused. See Lubbers, supra, at 109 n.1 (citing the 
August 1979 Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference newsletter); see also 
James P. Timony, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Federal Administrative Law 
Judges, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 807, 814–15 (1984) (relaying how Third Circuit
Judge Aldisert “noted” and dismissed “the past prejudice of some Article III federal 
judges, scholarly critics and attorneys who believe[d] that administrative law 
judges were second-class judges (if judges at all)” (citing NLRB v. Permanent 
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the demigods of federal adjudication. As both courts and ALJs have 
noted, the function of ALJs closely parallels that of Article III 
judges.3 ALJs hear evidence, decide factual issues, and apply legal 
principles in all formal administrative adjudications under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).4 Indeed, they outnumber 
Article III judges5 and decide more than two hundred and fifty 
thousand cases each year.6 But they lack the defining characteristics 
of Article III deities. Article III judges are installed under the 
Appointments Clause,7 enjoy tenure and salary protection during 
times of “good Behavior,”8 and are not generally subject to reversal 
Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 527–28 (3d Cir. 1981) (Aldisert, J., concurring))). Like 
Professor Lubbers, I use the ubiquitous acronym only for brevity. 
3 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978):
[P]roceedings [before an ALJ] are adversary in nature. . . . They 
are conducted before a trier of fact insulated from political 
influence. . . . A party is entitled to present his case by oral or 
documentary evidence . . . and the transcript of testimony and 
exhibits together with the pleadings constitute the exclusive 
record for decision. 
 
(citations omitted); Robin J. Artz et al., Advancing the Judicial Independence and 
Efficiency of the Administrative Judiciary: A Report to the President-Elect of the 
United States, 29 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 93, 95 (2009) (“ALJs are 
the functional equivalent of federal trial judges.”).
4 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–54, 556–57 (2006) (detailing requirements for formal 
administrative rulemaking and adjudication). Although ALJs can also preside in 
formal rulemaking proceedings, id. §§ 553(c), 556–57, formal rulemaking is 
extremely rare, see Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure 
Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 107 (2003) (“Because the 
impracticalities of formal rulemaking are well known, Congress rarely requires this 
technique, and courts avoid interpreting statutes to require it, even in the rare cases 
where the statute seems to do so.”). This Article concerns only ALJs’ duties in 
formal adjudications.
5 Compare Judges and Judgeships, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/ JudgesAndJudgeships/FederalJudgeships.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2013) (listing 874 total Article III judgeships), with Free Enter. 
Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3180–81 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
Federal Government relies on 1,584 ALJs to adjudicate administrative matters in 
over 25 agencies.”).
6 See Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections upon the Federal Administrative 
Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1346 n.18 (1992) (stating that ALJs decided 
more than two hundred and fifty thousand social security cases in 1990). 
7 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
8 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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by the executive branch.9 In contrast, ALJs are hired as mere 
employees by executive officials, receive more limited salary 
protection than Article III judges, and are subject to removal within 
the executive branch.10 Moreover, the agencies for which ALJs 
work—often themselves parties to the proceedings—can reverse 
ALJs’ decisions in toto.11 In Euripidean parlance, ALJs are equal to 
Article III judges, except for the Article III part.
The Structural Quandary
These differences between ALJs and Article III judges do 
more than chisel a chip on ALJs’ shoulders. They reveal material 
practical and constitutional tensions, if not constitutional violations, 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has recently revitalized. These tensions 
concern ALJs’ appointments, the President’s supervisory powers 
over ALJs, and ALJs’ independence and impartiality. These three 
concerns are in tension, rendering their resolution difficult.
First. If, as five current Supreme Court Justices have now 
suggested,12 ALJs are “inferior Officers” (not mere employees), the 
manner in which some are currently selected is likely 
unconstitutional.13 The Appointments Clause in Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution requires that such officers be appointed in one of four 
ways: by (1) the President with the Senate’s consent, (2) the 
President alone, (3) the courts of law, or (4) heads of departments.14
9 Federal agencies can reverse judicial statutory interpretations under 
certain circumstances. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983–84 (2005) (permitting agencies to provide authoritative 
interpretations of ambiguous statutory language even after a contrary judicial 
interpretation).
10. See generally infra Part I.
11 See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006) (“On appeal from or review of the [ALJ’s] 
initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the 
initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule.”).
12 See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3180–81 (2010) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ.) (asking 
whether the majority’s holding that dual for-cause insulation is unconstitutional 
would affect ALJs, who might be considered “Officers”); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 
U.S. 868, 910 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, 
joined by O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (“[ALJs] are all executive officers.” 
(emphasis omitted)).
13 See infra Part II.A.
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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ALJs, however, are selected by heads of agencies, only some of 
whom qualify as heads of departments.
Second. ALJs’ job (or tenure) protections may improperly 
limit the President’s implied power to remove and supervise 
executive-branch officers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.15
The agencies that select ALJs can remove them only for “good 
cause” and only with the consent of an independent federal agency, 
the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), whose members the 
President can remove only for enumerated reasons. A recent U.S. 
Supreme Court decision, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,
invalidated the use of “tiered” tenure protection (i.e., two layers of 
tenure protection between the President and the officer at issue) for 
inferior officers.16 The four dissenting Justices in that decision noted 
that ALJs’ two tiers of tenure protection (one for ALJs and one for 
the MSPB) would also appear to limit the President’s supervisory 
power improperly.17 In short, the Court’s most recent foray into this 
area suggests that the removal regime for ALJs clashes with the 
President’s executive authority.18
Third. At the same time, increasing presidential control over 
ALJs would create impartiality concerns under the Due Process 
Clause. Agencies are parties to proceedings before the same ALJs 
that they appoint and that they may remove for good cause (albeit 
subject to the MSPB’s consent).19 If ALJs lose one of their two tiers 
of tenure protection, either (1) agencies will be able to remove ALJs 
at will (and thus render the MSPB’s extant tenure protection and role 
meaningless) or (2) agencies will be able to remove ALJs for cause 
with the consent of the MSPB, whose members the President can 
remove at will. The Supreme Court has strongly indicated that, 
despite some contrary scholarly opinions, the current ALJ model is 
sufficient under the Due Process Clause. But its recent decision 
concerning recusal of elected state-court judges, Caperton v. A.T. 
15. See infra Part II.B.
16 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Act 
before us imposes a new type of restriction—two levels of protection from removal 
for those who nonetheless exercise significant executive power. Congress cannot 
limit the President’s authority in this way.”).
17 See id. at 3181 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Does every losing party before 
an ALJ now have grounds to appeal on the basis that the decision entered against 
him is unconstitutional?”).
18 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
19 See infra Part II.C.
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Massey Coal Co.,20 casts doubt on this view. The agencies’ ability to 
appoint ALJs and initiate their removal creates obvious incentives for 
ALJs to favor agency positions. Regardless of whether this partiality 
problem assumes an unconstitutional dimension, the current structure 
raises problems for ALJs, agencies, parties that appear before ALJs, 
and society as a whole.
Existing proposals to reform the ALJ system fail to identify, 
much less solve, these competing concerns.21 For instance, simply 
permitting a department head (perhaps of a new independent agency) 
to appoint ALJs would resolve the appointment issue, but not fully 
address due process or presidential-supervision concerns. Likewise, 
providing ALJs increased tenure protection may resolve lingering 
independence concerns, but leave the President with insufficient 
supervisory power over ALJs, while not addressing the appointment 
issue at all. Conversely, reducing ALJ tenure protection may resolve 
presidential-supervision concerns, but damage ALJ independence 
and, once again, fail to address Appointments Clause concerns.
The Solution
My proposed remedy is to permit the D.C. Circuit to appoint, 
discipline, and remove ALJs upon request from administrative 
agencies.22 Permitting a “Court[] of Law” to appoint ALJs, who are 
at most “inferior Officers” within the executive branch, comports 
with the text of the Appointments Clause and Supreme Court case 
law.23 To be sure, the Court has prohibited Congress from creating 
“incongruous” interbranch appointments.24 Although the Court’s 
20 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
21 See infra Part III.
22 See infra Part IV.A.
23 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he Congress may by law vest the 
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper . . . in the Courts of 
Law . . . .”).
24 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 675 (1988):
We do not mean to say that Congress’ power to provide for 
interbranch appointments of ‘inferior officers’ is unlimited. In 
addition to separation of powers concerns . . . Congress’ decision 
to vest the appointment power in the courts would be improper if 
there was some ‘incongruity’ between the functions normally 
performed by the courts and the performance of their duty to 
appoint.
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existing approach to incongruity is murky, I extract from it a three-
part inquiry that unifies the incongruity principle with the separation-
of-powers constraints that the Court has erected in this field. In short, 
courts should deem an interbranch appointment appropriate when 
(1) Congress has a significant justification for turning to its 
interbranch-appointment power, (2) the power to appoint (and an 
incidental power to remove) does not impede the appointing branch’s 
central functioning under the U.S. Constitution, and (3) the lack of 
appointment (and removal) power does not, likewise, impede the 
competing branch’s central functioning.
The D.C. Circuit’s appointment of ALJs satisfies these three 
criteria. First, it is significantly justified because it resolves the three 
constitutional concerns. It does so by properly placing the 
appointment power in a “court of law”; ending “tiered” removal 
protection within the executive branch for ALJs by appropriately 
giving the D.C. Circuit the power to remove ALJs, as consistent with 
existing interbranch-appointment doctrine and even the underlying 
rationale of Free Enterprise Fund; and limiting the executive 
branch’s role in appointing and removing the adjudicators for formal 
proceedings to which executive agencies are often parties. Second, 
the interbranch appointment does not impede the central functioning 
of the D.C. Circuit. As the court that hears numerous administrative 
law cases and has the lowest judge-to-merits-decisions ratio among 
the circuit courts, the D.C. Circuit has the expertise and time to 
appoint and remove other adjudicators. Indeed, Article III courts 
currently perform the interbranch appointment and removal of Article
I bankruptcy judges, as well as the intrabranch appointment and 
removal of magistrate judges and special masters. Third, the 
interbranch appointment does not impede the central functioning of 
the executive branch. The executive branch may still formulate all 
administrative policy that arises from formal adjudication by 
continuing to reverse ALJ decisions in toto under the APA.
Ultimately, this Article seeks to do three things. It seeks to 
identify the three competing concerns surrounding ALJs, suggest a 
workable statutory solution to a major problem in administrative law 
that recent Supreme Court decisions have brought into focus, and 
clarify the nature and benefits of Congress’s interbranch-appointment 
power for the federal administrative state. To those ends, Part I 
provides a brief synopsis of current ALJ hiring, removal, and 
independence protections. Part II considers the constitutional 
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questions surrounding ALJs’ selection, removal, and independence to 
bring the tripartite quandary into clear view. Part III considers the 
limitations on prior solutions and scholarship in light of the 
quandary, most of which focus only on ALJ independence. And 
finally, Part IV provides a refined manner of analyzing the propriety 
of interbranch appointments and argues that an interbranch 
appointment of ALJs resolves the quandary. Even with a permissible 
interbranch appointment, ALJs certainly won’t be gods. But a limited 
ALJ apotheosis, brought about by an interbranch appointment, should 
mitigate concerns that surround ALJs’ place within our government 
of separated powers.
I. ALJS’ CURRENT SELECTION, REMOVAL, AND PROTECTIONS
A brief exposition of the current manner of ALJ selection, 
removal, and independence permits a better understanding of the 
theoretical and doctrinal concerns mentioned above. An interbranch-
appointment remedy, as explained later, can adopt much of the 
current ALJ appointment and removal structure by reallocating 
various powers to effect the desired structural improvement.
A. Current ALJ Selection
The appointment of ALJs, unlike that of Article III judges, 
does not require the President’s nomination and the Senate’s 
confirmation.25 Instead, each federal agency selects ALJs “as are 
necessary” for the agency to conduct formal adjudicatory 
proceedings.26 The President is not directly, if at all, involved in the 
selection of ALJs, and the Senate does not serve as a check on the 
agency’s choice.
But agencies do not have carte blanche when selecting ALJs. 
Instead, the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) creates and 
administers standards for ALJ selection for the approximately sixteen 
hundred federal ALJs.27 Candidates must be licensed attorneys with 
25 See Harold Levinson, The Status of the Administrative Judge, 38 AM. J.
COMP. L. (SUPP.) 523, 532–33 (1990) (contrasting the Article III appointment 
process with ALJ selection). 
26 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006).
27 See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3180–81 (2010) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“My research reflects that the Federal Government relies 
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at least seven years’ experience and pass an examination that tests 
their ability to draft a decision and analyze relevant legal issues.28
Military veterans receive five to ten preference points.29 Based on 
their experiences, examination scores, and veteran statuses, the 
highest-scoring candidates are placed on a list.30 Agencies, under 
what is known as the “Rule of Three,”31 may then select from the 
three highest-ranking candidates.32
Agencies, perhaps unsurprisingly, have sought to avoid the 
Rule of Three. They have instead sought “selective certification.”33
on 1,584 ALJs to adjudicate administrative matters in over 25 agencies.”); 
Levinson, supra note 25, at 533. 
28 VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34607,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2010); Jesse Etelson, The New 
ALJ Examination: A Bright, Shining Lie Redux, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 185, 191–93
(1991) (explaining and critiquing the ALJ written examination that requires 
candidates to draft a hypothetical opinion).
29 Veterans’ Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3309; 5 C.F.R. § 302.201 (2012). 
The OPM’s scoring formulation for veterans led to protracted litigation and even 
temporary suspension of hiring ALJs from 1999 to 2003. BURROWS, supra note 28,
at 3: 
The litigation arose out of changes that OPM made in 1996 to the 
scoring formula that is used to rate and rank potential ALJs. 
These changes . . . resulted in a scoring system that . . . [gave] 
veterans a significant hiring advantage over non-veterans. As a
consequence, non-veteran applicants for ALJ positions sued, 
claiming that the new scoring formula was unlawful. 
 
See also Meeker v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 319 F.3d 1368, 1369–72 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(describing the litigation’s journey to the Federal Circuit). ALJs and agencies have 
criticized the veterans’ preference because an additional ten points based on 
veteran status can have a significant effect on the final list of candidates, whose 
scores range from eighty to one hundred points. See Lubbers, supra note 2, at 115–
16 (“Since there is only a 20-point spread on scores among all ALJ eligibles (from 
80 to 100), the addition of 5 to 10 veterans preference points to any score can 
change by many places an eligible’s ranking on the register.”). 
30 See BURROWS, supra note 28, at 2 (“Applicants who meet the[ ] 
minimum qualification standards and pass the examination are then assigned a 
score and placed on a register of eligible hires.”).
31 Artz et al., supra note 3, at 101.
32 See BURROWS, supra note 28, at 2–3 (“Agencies then select an ALJ 
from the top three available candidates, taking into account the location of the 
position, the geographical preference of the candidate, and veterans’ preference 
rules.”). 
33 Lubbers, supra note 2, at 117.
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Selective certification permits an agency, “upon a showing of 
necessity and with the prior approval of OPM, . . . to appoint 
specially certified eligibles without regard to their ranking in relation 
to other eligibles . . . who lack the special certification.”34 Numerous 
agencies routinely engaged in selective certification from the 1960s 
until the early 1980s, generally justified by needing ALJs with 
technical knowledge and experience.35 Yet after substantial criticism 
that selective certification allowed agencies to hire ALJs with a more 
“pro-enforcement attitude,”36 the OPM ended selective certification 
in 1984.37 Much to ALJs’ alarm,38 certain agencies have recently 
sought to obtain waivers from the OPM to engage in selective 
certification once again39 and even appealed to Congress for 
legislative dispensation from the OPM’s refusal.40
Despite the OPM’s rejection of selective certification, ALJs 
are dissatisfied with the OPM. In a 2008 report to President-elect 
Obama, the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference argued 
that the OPM should be divested of its authority to appoint and 
34 Id.
35 See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 101; see also BURROWS, supra note 28,
at 5–6 (overviewing the history of selective certification from before the APA’s 
enactment through the 1980s).
36 Lubbers, supra note 2, at 118.
37 See BURROWS, supra note 28, at 6 (“In 1984, OPM ended the selective 
certification procedure in Examination Announcement No. 318. Agencies were no 
longer allowed to formally require subject-matter expertise.”); see also 5 C.F.R. 
§ 332.404 (2012) (requiring agency to select from the “highest three eligibles”).
38 See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 98, 101–02 (“We urge [the President-
Elect] to appoint agency heads who will respect, uphold, and enforce the provisions 
of the APA regarding the federal agency administrative adjudication process. In 
recent years, agency heads have been making legislative efforts to erode . . . the 
APA provisions that ensure the independence of ALJ decision-making.”).
39 See BURROWS, supra note 28, at 6 (noting that the International Trade 
Commission (“ITC”) and the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) have sought 
selective-certification powers). 
40 Artz et al., supra note 3, at 101–02 (noting that the ITC and the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) both sought legislation to permit them to evade the 
OPM’s refusal to permit selective certification). But see U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-14, RESULTS-ORIENTED CULTURES: OFFICE OF 
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SHOULD REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
PROGRAM TO IMPROVE HIRING AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 8–10 (2010) 
[hereinafter GAO-10-14] (reporting that the SSA and Health and Human Services 
officials were pleased with the quality of ALJ candidates, although they sought 
changes—such as by awarding bonus points to eligible candidates—to ensure that 
the appointment considered “specialized knowledge”).
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review ALJs.41 The ALJs complained that the OPM eliminated the 
office that selected ALJs (by assigning that office’s duties to other 
offices within the OPM), eliminated the requirement for ALJ 
candidates to have litigation experience,42 altered the ALJ-exam 
schedule in a manner that rendered it “difficult for private sector 
attorneys to apply,”43 and sought to reward ALJs based on an 
agency’s political goals.44 Ultimately, the ALJs reported that “the 
OPM . . . has sought to undermine ALJs[’] independence and 
downgrade ALJs’ level of experience and competence.”45 Partially in 
response to ALJs’ concerns, the Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”) has recently recommended certain changes to Congress 
concerning ALJ hiring and supervision.46
B. Current ALJ Tenure Protections and Independence
Once selected, ALJs have certain protections from political 
forces but limited independence in making final decisions. The APA 
provides for a separation of functions between ALJs and certain 
agency employees. ALJs may not perform investigative or 
prosecutorial functions or report to an employee who does, or have 
ex parte contacts concerning a fact at issue.47 But heads of agencies 
41 See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 106 (“[W]e advocate the creation of a 
new independent agency . . . which would be responsible for the functions that the 
OPM has been performing, or should have been performing . . . .”).
42 Id. at 105–06.
43 Id. at 106.
44 See id. at 105 (“[T]he OPM has taken the position that ALJs are no 
different from other federal employees and should be covered by a ‘pay for 
performance’ system that measures performance by agency (i.e., political) goals. If 
implemented, OPM’s position would result in inappropriate agency influence over 
the functions performed by ALJs . . . .”).
45 Id. at 106.
46 See GAO-10-14, supra note 40, at 26–28 (suggesting, among other 
things, that ALJs become more involved in hiring and personnel-management 
decisions).
47 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1)–(2) (2006). Nevertheless, the ALJ may remain 
responsible to the head of the agency, although the head of the agency also 
oversees investigations and prosecutions. See id. § 554(d)(2)(C); Harold H. Bruff, 
Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 346 (1991) 
(describing separation of powers for ALJs).
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can still set agency policy and supervise ALJs.48 They have the 
authority to reverse ALJs’ decisions in full, as to both fact and law.49
Agencies, however, must provide some deference to ALJs’ witness-
demeanor observations50 and consider the ALJs’ initial decision 
during administrative appeal.51
If unsatisfied with their power to reverse ALJ decisions, 
agencies have a circumscribed ability to discipline and remove ALJs. 
Agencies may remove and generally discipline ALJs only for “good 
cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection 
Board” after a formal administrative hearing.52 The MSPB members, 
like ALJs, also enjoy tenure protection because the President can 
remove them “only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance 
in office.”53 Otherwise, ALJs essentially have life tenure because 
they do not serve for a period of years in office.54
ALJs’ effective life tenure, however, loses some of its sheen 
because of the ambiguity of the good cause standard that governs 
MSPB proceedings.55 That standard has permitted removal for, 
48 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2)(C) (exempting the “agency or a member or 
members of the body comprising the agency” from the separation-of-functions 
requirement).
49 See id. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the 
agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except 
as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule.”); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 
340 U.S. 474, 494–95 (1951) (explaining that the APA permits agencies to decline 
adopting an ALJ’s recommendations).
50 Timony, supra note 2, at 811 (citing Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 
496; E. Eng’g & Elevator Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 1980)).
51 Id. at 811–12 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1982)).
52 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
53 Id. § 1202(d).
54 See Verkuil, supra note 6, at 1344. Professor Verkuil argues that ALJs 
have more secure tenure than bankruptcy and magistrate judges because ALJs are 
not appointed to terms of office. See id. Although ALJs do not have to worry about 
an essentially standardless judicial reappointment, cf. Tuan Samahon, Are 
Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional? An Appointments Clause Challenge, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 233, 248 (2008) (“During 1998 to 2002, circuit courts reappointed 
over 90% of those bankruptcy judges applying for reappointment.”), they can be 
removed under what appears to be a more liberal tenure-protection provision by 
another executive entity. See infra notes 55–62 and accompanying text.
55 Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321, 325 (1984); Harold J. 
Krent & Lindsay DuVall, Accommodating ALJ Decision Making Independence 
with Institutional Interests of the Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 34 (2005) (“[T]he meaning of ‘cause’ is unclear . . . .”).
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among other things, being absent for extended periods, declining to 
set hearing dates, and having a “high rate of significant adjudicatory 
errors.”56 Moreover, the MSPB has indicated that insubordination 
can constitute cause, although the Board left unclear how specific the 
agency’s instructions and how overwhelming the agency’s evidence 
of insubordination must be.57
In light of the uncertain governing removal standard, perhaps 
it is not surprising that more removal proceedings have been brought 
against ALJs than against Article III judges. Article III judges retain 
their appointments “during good Behavior”—a more demanding 
standard than good cause—and are removed only after the 
cumbersome interbranch-collaborative process of impeachment.58
Only fifteen Article III judges have been impeached in more than two 
hundred years.59 In contrast, agencies have brought more than twenty 
actions against ALJs from 1946 to 1992.60 ALJs have noted these 
56 BURROWS, supra note 28, at 8 (quoting A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY 
ADJUDICATION 172 (Michael Asimov ed., 2003)).
57 Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. at 326, 331; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons 
from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 506 (1990) (criticizing 
MSPB’s insubordination dicta and its “abysmal ignorance of statistics” in 
appearing to reject the Agency’s productivity argument). The MSPB, earlier in its 
opinion, stated, “If the agency is basing its charge on reasons which constitute an 
improper interference with the performance by an ALJ of his or her judicial 
functions, the charge cannot constitute good cause.” Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. at 328.
58 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3; Goodman, 19 
M.S.P.R. at 326 (citing McEachern v. Macy, 341 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1965)) 
(holding that good cause standard has been more broadly interpreted than good-
behavior standard); Benton v. United States, 488 F.2d 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1973); and 
Chocallo v. Prokop, C.A. No. 80–1053 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 1980), aff’d mem., 673 
F.2d 551 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
59 Impeachments of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home. nsf/page/judges_impeachments.html (last visited 
May 16, 2011). Three of the impeached judges resigned before the Senate’s 
impeachment trials concluded. See id.
60 BURROWS, supra note 28, at 9; James E. Moliterno, The Administrative 
Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1222 n.150 (2006) 
(citing Morell E. Mullins, Manual for Administrative Law Judges, 23 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES i, 116 (2004)). Social Security Commissioner Michael 
Astrue stated that fifty-eight ALJs have been disciplined since 2007, mostly for 
deciding too few cases. See David Ingram, Social Security’s Disability Judges 
Come Under Scrutiny, THE BLT: BLOG OF LEGALTIMES (July 11, 2011, 5:14 PM), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/07/social-securitys-disability-judges-come-
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removal attempts—especially the fifteen of which occurred over a 
six-year period in the 1970s and 1980s61—and the Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”) Commissioner’s recent legislative proposal 
to obtain authority to “discipline” ALJs for undefined “offenses” 
without prior findings by the MSPB.62
II. PRACTICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOMFORT
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions either create or 
reenergize three significant issues surrounding ALJs’ current 
selection and removal. First, does the method of ALJs’ selection 
violate the Appointments Clause? Second, do ALJs’ tenure 
protections improperly impede the President’s supervisory powers? 
Finally, do ALJs’ current tenure protections (or reduced protections, 
if required under Article II) create due process and fairness concerns? 
Scholars have typically limited themselves to addressing the 
appropriate balance between ALJ independence and subordination, 
but without considering the three separation-of-powers concerns that 
have come into sharper relief recently. Once the reader considers the 
competing concerns below, the limitations of previously proposed 
solutions and scholarship become apparent.
A. Improper Appointments?
The Appointments Clause governs the appointment of all 
“Officers of the United States.”63 Federal “[o]fficers” are those who 
“exercise significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United 
States.”64 They fall into two categories—principal and inferior 
officers.65 Principal officers, most likely those who report directly to 
under-scrutiny.html. But one ALJ was placed on administrative leave based on his 
high approval of disability benefits. See id.
61 Bruff, supra note 47, at 348 (noting, in 1991, the “recent, sharp upturn 
in the frequency of [ALJ] removal attempts”); Timony, supra note 2, at 807 & n.2 
(listing cases).
62 Artz et al., supra note 3, at 103–04.
63 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 
509–10 (1878).
64 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
65 Germaine, 99 U.S. at 509 (“The Constitution for purposes of 
appointment very clearly divides all its officers into two classes [viz., ‘primary’ and 
‘inferior’ officers].”) (quoted in Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 183 (1994) 
(Souter, J., concurring) (referring to officers as “principal and inferior officers”)).
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the President, must be nominated by the President and confirmed by 
the Senate.66 But the so-called “Excepting Clause”67 to the 
Appointments Clause gives Congress flexibility in the appointing of 
inferior officers,68 that is, “officers whose work is directed and 
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by 
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate”69
or officers of lesser importance as measured by some function of 
their duties, tenure, and supervision.70 Inferior officers may be 
appointed in one of the following four ways, as Congress “think[s] 
proper”: in the same manner as principal officers, by the President 
alone, by a Court of Law, or by the Head of a Department.71 The 
Appointments Clause does not apply to those who are “mere 
employees.”72 A preliminary issue surrounding ALJs is whether they 
are inferior officers or mere employees.
If they are inferior officers, many ALJs’ appointments are 
likely improper. Although the Excepting Clause permits Congress to 
bestow the appointment power of inferior officers on department 
heads, Congress has not done so for all ALJs. Instead, Congress, 
through the APA, permits “[e]ach agency” to select its ALJs “as are 
necessary.”73 Departments and agencies, despite their similarity, are 
not identical. An “agency” is a statutory term that refers to “each 
authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is 
within or subject to review by another agency,” save for a few 
enumerated exceptions.74 But a “department” is a constitutional 
animal that refers to a “freestanding component of the Executive 
Branch, not subordinate to or contained within any other such 
component”75 with a “distinct province, in which a class of duties are 
66 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997).
67 Id. at 660 (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
627–28 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
68 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
69 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663.
70 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988).
71 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
72 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976) (per curiam) (citing 
Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890); United States v. Germaine, 99 
U.S. 508, 510 (1878)).
73 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006).
74 Id. § 551(1).
75 Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 (2010).
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[sic] allotted.”76 Because an agency need not have the two key 
characteristics of a department (independence and self-containment 
from other administrative entities), not all agencies that appoint ALJs 
are departments. Those ALJs selected by a nondepartment “agency” 
are not properly appointed under the Appointments Clause.77
But for the method of selection to acquire constitutional 
import, ALJs must be officers, not mere employees. To determine 
ALJs’ status, one must decide whether ALJs “exercis[e] significant 
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States”78 or serve as 
“lesser functionaries”79—an inquiry reminiscent of distinguishing 
High Baroque from Rococo.80 Yet, the determination is important 
76 Id. at 3162 (quoting 1 N. WEBSTER, Department Definition, in 
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (photo. reprint 1995) (1828) 
(def. 2)).
77 For each ALJ appointment, one must know which entity is appointing 
and whether that entity is a department. Justice Breyer prepared a list of agencies 
that employ ALJs in his dissent in Free Enterprise Fund. See Free Enter. Fund,
130 S. Ct. at 3214 app. C (Breyer, J., dissenting). Most federal ALJs work for the 
SSA, see id., which is likely a department because it is independent and self-
contained. See 42 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2006). But several of the other listed agencies—
including the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, among others—may not 
qualify as departments. See Kent Barnett, The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau’s Appointment with Trouble, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1459 (2011) (arguing that 
the Court’s definition of “department” does not clarify whether independence and 
self-containment are both necessary, or individually sufficient, characteristics for 
departmental status); see also Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting 
that the FDIC abandoned its argument that the Office of Thrift Supervision, which 
selected ALJs, was a department). By adopting my solution in Part IV, infra, one
can avoid this tedious, and perhaps ultimately indeterminate, inquiry into 
departmental status for those agencies appointing numerous ALJs. 
Moreover, if various agencies are not departments, the approbation 
doctrine (i.e., a department head’s approval cures a subordinate’s otherwise 
unconstitutional appointment) will not likely salvage the otherwise unconstitutional 
appointments. The APA does not expressly permit department heads to approbate 
subordinate agencies’ ALJ appointments, and thus any approbation would lack 
statutory authority. See Barnett, supra, at 1481 n.161 (citing United States v. 
Smith, 124 U.S. 525, 532–33 (1888); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 
385, 393–94 (1868)). 
78 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
79 Id. at 126 n.162 (citing Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890); 
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878)).
80 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3178–82 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Landry, 204 F.3d at 1132–34. The Office of Legal Counsel has 
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because a “defect in [an ALJ’s] appointment [is] an irregularity 
which would invalidate a resulting order.”81
ALJs appear to exercise significant authority under federal 
law. Their positions are established by law.82 ALJs provide initial 
decisions that establish factual findings and apply agency regulations 
and policy.83 ALJs have significant discretion to oversee discovery, 
issue subpoenas, and sanction parties in regulatory, enforcement, and 
licensing proceedings.84 A party’s violation of certain ALJ orders can 
lead to criminal penalties.85 During administrative review, the agency 
must provide some deference to the ALJ’s credibility findings and 
consider the ALJ’s decision.86 Within some agencies, these findings 
are generally final.87
In light of others whom the Supreme Court has deemed 
inferior officers, ALJs’ authority seems more than sufficient to 
provide similar status. The Court has held that district-court clerks, 
thousands of clerks within the Treasury and Interior Departments, an 
assistant surgeon, a cadet-engineer, election monitors, federal 
marshals, military judges, Article I judges, and the general counsel 
for the Transportation Department are inferior officers.88 Perhaps, 
prepared a lengthy memorandum that addresses characteristics that distinguish 
employees from officers. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant 
Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the General 
Counsels of the Executive Branch, Regarding Officers of the United States Within 
the Meaning of the Appointments Clause 3 (Apr. 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2007 /appointmentsclausev10.pdf. The memo concludes 
that an officer must have been delegated sovereign authority in a “continuing” 
fashion. See id. But the drafters freely concede that “the Supreme Court has not 
articulated the precise scope and application of the Clause’s requirements.” See id.
81 United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952).
82 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133.
83 See Timony, supra note 2, at 812.
84 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1134 (comparing similar duties to special trial 
judges within the U.S. Tax Court, whom the Supreme Court in Freytag v. 
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991), held were inferior officers); Timony, 
supra note 2, at 812–13.
85 See Timony, supra note 2, at 813.
86 See id. at 811–12.
87 See id. at 812.
88 See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3179 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (citing cases).
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then, it is not surprising that five current Justices have suggested that 
ALJs also rise to this level.89
But Congress and the D.C. Circuit (the last court to have its 
say on the issue) may think otherwise. Congress referred to ALJs in 
the APA as “presiding employee[s],”90 although this reference might 
be understood as a lingering indignity from the ALJs’ “hearing 
examiner” past.91 Likewise, the D.C. Circuit held in Landry v. FDIC
that ALJs appointed by the Office of Thrift Supervision were 
employees, despite their significant authority, because they have no 
statutory authority to issue final opinions.92 The majority concluded 
that the Court in Freytag v. Commissioner held that special trial 
judges for the U.S. Tax Court (“STJs”) were inferior officers only 
because they had the power to issue final decisions.93 The majority 
acknowledged that the Freytag Court stated that it would not have 
altered its conclusion even if the STJs’ nonfinal decisionmaking 
powers were less significant.94 But the Landry majority held that the 
Freytag Court would not have then mentioned the STJs’ final 
decisionmaking powers (which were not employed in the Freytag
case) unless those powers were “critical to the Court’s decision.”95
Judge Randolph dissented in Landry and had the better 
argument. As he demonstrated, the Freytag Court’s discussion of the 
STJs’ finality power was part of an alternative holding,96 provided 
after the Court had announced its conclusion that “a special trial 
judge is an inferior Office[r] whose appointment must conform to the 
89 See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by three other justices); Freytag,
501 U.S. at 920 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment, 
joined by Kennedy, J.). But see Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160 n.10 (majority 
opinion joined by Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.) (suggesting, in dicta, that ALJs may be 
employees).
90 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006); see also id. § 554(d) (referring to ALJs as 
“[t]he employee who presides”). But see id. § 556(b)(3) (referring to ALJs as 
“administrative law judges”).
91 See supra note 2.
92 Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also
Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco—A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 71 (1979) 
(describing ALJs’ inability to issue final decisions). 
93 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1134.
94 Id. (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882).
95 Id. (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882).
96 Id. at 1142 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment).
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Appointments Clause.”97 The authority to issue final decisions thus 
was not a necessary criterion. Indeed, federal magistrate judges, like 
ALJs, provide only initial decisions that a district court may review 
de novo, and they have long been deemed “inferior Officers” subject 
to appointment by “Courts of Law.”98 Moreover, had ALJs the power 
to issue final decisions, they well could be transformed into principal 
officers, whose “work [would not be] directed and supervised at 
some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.”99 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court in Edmond v. United States held that the judges of the Coast 
Guard Court of Criminal Appeals were inferior, not principal, 
officers because they “have no power to render a final decision on 
behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by other 
Executive officers.”100 The agencies’ power to overrule, in other 
words, merely establishes ALJs’ status as inferior officers.
Aside from this substantial constitutional concern, the ALJ-
selection process is less than satisfactory to ALJs, agencies, and those 
affected by agency adjudication. ALJs have complained about the 
OPM’s lack of interest in the selection process and recently revised 
selection criteria,101 and scholars have complained about the 
overbearing impact of the veterans’ preference.102 The agencies, too, 
have felt constrained by the Rule of Three and have sought a greater 
role in selecting ALJs with expertise in the agencies’ subject 
97 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
98 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1143 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment) (citing Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 
344, 352–54 (1931); Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 378 (1901); Pacemaker 
Diagnostic Clinic, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 545 (9th Cir. 1984) (en 
banc)). But see Stacy M. Lindstedt, Developing the Duffy Defect: Identifying Which 
Government Workers Are Constitutionally Required to Be Appointed, 76 MO. L. 
REV. 1143, 1178–80 (2011) (arguing that a government worker should be deemed 
to have “significant authority” (as required for status as an “officer”) only if that 
worker’s actions are “final,” as that term is understood under the APA).
99 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142 (quoting Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 
651, 663 (1997)). 
100 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665.
101 See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 105–06.
102 See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 2, at 115–16 (describing how a ten-point 
increase for certain veterans (1) substantially impacts eligible candidates’ ordering 
because the scores have only a twenty-point range and (2) limits the number of 
women candidates).
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matters.103 Accordingly, even if current ALJ selection does not 
violate the Appointments Clause, key actors in the selection 
process—particularly ALJs and the agencies—are dissatisfied with 
the current regime.
B. Improperly Impeding Presidential Supervision?
ALJs’ tenure protection also presents a substantial 
constitutional question after Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB.104 The 
Court’s 5-4 decision in that case invalidated Congress’s use of two 
layers of tenure protection to shield Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) members from the President’s 
removal.105 The SEC could appoint and remove PCAOB members.106
One (implied) tenure-protection provision protected members of the 
SEC from the President’s at-will removal,107 and a second (statutory) 
tenure-protection provision protected PCAOB members from the 
SEC’s at-will removal.108 The Court invalidated this scheme because 
the two tiers of tenure protection together unconstitutionally 
impinged the President’s supervisory power by preventing him from 
holding the SEC responsible for PCAOB’s actions in the same 
manner as he could hold the SEC accountable for its other 
responsibilities.109
As Justice Breyer argued in his dissent, Free Enterprise Fund
suggests that ALJs’ tenure protections are also in jeopardy.110 Like 
PCAOB members, two tiers of tenure protection shield ALJs from 
the President’s control. As for the first tier, ALJs may be removed 
only for good cause,111 meaning that “[ALJs] [a]re not to be . . .
discharged at the whim or caprice of the agency or for political 
reasons.”112 That good cause must be established by the MSPB,113
whose members are shielded from the President’s at-will removal by 
103 See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
104 Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
105 Id. at 3147.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 3148–49.
108 Id. at 3148.
109 Id. at 3154.
110 Id. at 3180–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2006).
112 Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conf., 345 U.S. 128, 142 (1953).
113 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
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a second tier of tenure protection.114 (Indeed, a third tier of tenure 
protection may exist if the agency, such as the SEC, that may seek 
removal is independent and has its own tenure protection.115) Justice 
Breyer argued that the majority’s decision suggested that “every 
losing party before an ALJ now ha[s] grounds to appeal on the basis 
that the decision entered against him is unconstitutional.”116 The 
majority responded that its “holding does not address . . . [ALJs],” 
while suggesting that ALJs may be permitted additional protections 
based on their ambiguous officer/employee status or their 
adjudicative, as opposed to policymaking, functions.117
The majority’s proposed distinctions118 are unsound as stated, 
devaluing the dicta for lower courts and rendering Justice Breyer’s 
premonition all the more foreboding. First, the majority suggests, 
without explanation, that Congress may limit the President’s 
supervisory power over employees to a greater degree than 
officers.119 That the President needs supervisory control over 
policymakers, however, does not mean that he should have less, as 
opposed to equal, control over those who perform mostly ministerial, 
yet often still discretionary and important, tasks. The President 
should be able to oversee all people who implement executive policy 
because doing so is necessary for the President to take care that the 
114 Id. § 1202(d).
115 See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667, 701 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[Independent agency] is the term that 
traditionally has been applied . . . to agencies . . . whose heads are not removable at 
will.”), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
116 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3181 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the holding does not specifically address this issue).
117 Id. at 3160 n.10 (majority opinion). I previously suggested another 
manner of limiting the majority’s opinion to prevent the invalidation of ALJs’ 
tenure protections. See Kent Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon,
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1397–99 (2012) (arguing that the particular 
combination of tenure protections for ALJs does not impermissibly interfere with 
the President’s supervisory power).
118 Despite the majority’s eschewal or rejection of functionalism in Free 
Enterprise Fund’s discussion of the President’s removal power, see Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and the 
Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of 
Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 
DUKE L.J. 1599, 1602 (2012); infra note 191 and accompanying text, these 
distinctions concerning ALJs are conspicuously functional.
119 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160 n.10.
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law is faithfully executed.120 After all, it would be odd, at the very 
least, if the President were to have more control over cabinet 
members confirmed by the Senate than the President’s own 
administrative assistants.
Second, the President does not necessarily need less 
supervisory authority over ALJs merely because they engage in 
adjudication.121 After all, “agencies use adjudication to form 
policy.”122 Indeed, certain agencies, such as the National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB”), create policy primarily through 
adjudication, not rulemaking.123 Moreover, as Justice Breyer pointed 
out in his dissent, the PCAOB members, like ALJs, also exercised 
adjudicatory powers provided by statute, but the majority invalidated 
their tenure protection anyway without mentioning those powers.124
Nevertheless, as discussed in Parts IV.C.1 and IV.C.3 of this Article, 
ALJs’ sole adjudicatory function—in formal proceedings—should 
permit Congress to limit the President’s supervisory power over 
ALJs without undermining the majority’s decision.125
Ultimately, like the selection methods for ALJs, ALJs’ tiered-
tenure-protection provisions may or may not prove to be 
constitutional. But at the very least, the Court has flagged a serious 
issue concerning ALJs’ potentially excessive tenure protection. And 
120 Compare generally id. (invalidating tenure protection for inferior 
officers whom a department head of an independent agency appointed), with Myers 
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 173–74 (1926) (approving of Civil Service 
protections, despite invalidating tenure protection for inferior officers appointed by 
department heads of executive, as opposed to independent, agencies). 
121 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160 n.10.
122 Bruff, supra note 47, at 356; accord SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 
194, 202–03 (1947). 
123 See John L. Gedid, ALJ Ethics: Conundrums, Dilemmas, and 
Paradoxes, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 33, 38 n.23 (2002) (explaining how in its first 
fifty years of existence the NLRB made all its decisions through adjudication and 
did not promulgate a single rule).
124 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3177 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
125 Although ALJs for a handful of agencies may (but rarely do) preside 
over formal rulemaking proceedings, see supra note 4, their function is nearly 
identical in these proceedings because they help prepare a formal record and, at 
times, provide an initial decision. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Final, But Often Fallible: 
Recognizing Problems with ALJ Finality, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 53, 60 (2004). 
Because the function of ALJs is essentially unchanged and ALJs are essentially 
bound by the same APA requirements for both formal adjudication and rulemaking, 
see 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (2006), their limited and rare ability to preside over 
rulemaking should not require additional presidential supervisory power. 
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this question, like the appointments question, can be resolved without 
awaiting a definitive answer from the Supreme Court.
C. Insufficient Impartiality?
Whether or not the Court would invalidate ALJs’ tenure 
protection, their limited independence raises impartiality, and thus 
due process, concerns. Scholars have disagreed as to whether ALJs 
are sufficiently independent to ensure their impartiality. Some 
Supreme Court decisions, for their part, strongly suggest that ALJs’ 
independence suffices under the Due Process Clause, but their 
limited rationales are not wholly satisfying. The Court’s recent 
decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,126 however, may 
suggest that the method of ALJs’ appointment and removal provides 
too little independence. Although Caperton concerned state judicial 
elections, its reasoning and concern over impartiality applies equally, 
if not with more strength, to administrative adjudication.
My purpose here is not to describe or critique fully the 
numerous arguments in academic literature concerning the nature and 
breadth, whether normative or descriptive, of ALJ independence. 
What follows, instead, is a brief synthesis of the arguments 
concerning ALJ impartiality, a critical review of often-invoked 
Supreme Court decisions, and an assessment of the impact that 
Caperton and Free Enterprise Fund may have on the due process 
issue. As with the ALJ appointment and presidential-supervision 
concerns, the purpose here is merely to identify the significant 
constitutional concern, not to resolve whether a constitutional 
violation exists.
1. Brief Overview of the Impartiality Debate
Due process demands impartiality and fairness.127
Independence can further these values, but the amount of 
126 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
127 See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (outlining situations in 
which the probability of actual bias on the part of the decisionmaker is 
constitutionally intolerable); Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1267, 1279–87 (1975) (describing the elements of a fair hearing); Krent & 
DuVall, supra note 55, at 9–10 (stressing the importance of impartial adjudications 
for ALJs); Christopher B. McNeil, The Model Act Creating a State Central 
Hearing Agency: Promises, Practical Problems, and a Proposal for Change, 53 
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independence necessary will depend upon the interest at issue and the 
extent of the decisionmaker’s authority.128 Because an ALJ has a role 
in accomplishing “an agency task,” as opposed to reviewing the other
branches’ actions, she “cannot be entirely impartial.”129 The question 
is, then, whether ALJs are sufficiently independent to ensure 
sufficient impartiality.
Some aspects of ALJ selection and removal suggest 
insufficient independence to guarantee impartiality. The agency has 
the ability to select the ALJ candidate (from the three submitted 
candidates) whom it believes will be most sympathetic to agency 
positions.130 The ALJ, perhaps regardless of his or her background or 
predisposition to agency views, becomes inculcated with agency 
prerogatives and concerns.131 The agency often serves as a party to 
an administrative proceeding and can initiate an ALJ’s removal.132
Indeed, this “[r]emoval authority has always been associated with 
control: It is the sine qua non of effective supervision—the guarantee 
that subordinates will take direction.”133 This concern over the 
ADMIN. L. REV. 475, 479 (2001) (explaining that the hearing must be at a 
meaningful time in a meaningful manner to fulfill the fundamental due process 
requisite of providing “an opportunity to be heard”).
128 See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1214 (citing Stephen B. Burbank, 
What Do We Mean by “Judicial Independence”?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 325 
(2003)) (arguing that independence is also not “an all-or-nothing” proposition and 
that it is useful only to the extent that it furthers impartiality and separation of 
powers).
129 Gedid, supra note 123, at 54; see also id. at 38 (“ALJs are not impartial 
and neutral in the same sense as Article III judges, but frequently have a role in 
developing and applying agency policy.”). 
130 But the agency’s power seems similar to the President’s in selecting 
Article III judges. The President often selects judicial candidates who are likely to 
share the President’s judicial or political philosophy. And, indeed, the Senate and 
the President can select candidates whom they perceive as favoring the federal 
government’s position. 
131 Pillai, supra note 2, at 124–25; see also Bruff, supra note 47, at 352 
(“[T]hose who work within an agency are subject to a multitude of open or subtle 
socializing pressures that do not reach a separate institution.”).
132 See Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 34–35 (discussing how agencies 
oversee the conduct of ALJs to ensure competence and civility, and can remove 
ALJs for good cause).
133 Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent 
Counsel: Court Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MINN. L. REV. 363, 
421 (2001) (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)); accord Free 
Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157 (2010) (“The President has been 
given the power to oversee executive officers; he is not limited . . . to persuading 
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removal power becomes more urgent if ALJs’ tenure protections are 
invalidated, as Justice Breyer fears, because the MSPB’s review of an 
agency’s at-will removal of an ALJ would be meaningless.134 Finally, 
ALJs have indicated that agencies are perceived to interfere with ALJ 
decisions, and twenty-six percent of ALJs for the SSA have 
complained of Agency pressure to rule differently.135 An ALJ’s 
inculcation, appointment, and limited tenure protections create, the 
argument goes, both apparent and actual bias concerns.136
But ALJs have significant indicia of independence that 
support their impartiality. The OPM, after scoring ALJ candidates, 
limits agencies’ discretion in selecting candidates.137 The agencies 
can only initiate removal proceedings; they must convince another 
independent agency that good cause exists for the ALJ’s removal.138
This tenure protection appears meaningful because, despite numerous 
attempts, agencies have convinced the MSPB to remove only five 
ALJs as of 2006.139 Indeed, “it is generally understood [based on 
statutory and constitutional restrictions] that presidential 
supervision . . . should steer clear of interference in adjudications, no 
matter who performs them.”140 The APA promotes this 
understanding by limiting the ALJs’ ex parte contacts with parties,141
limiting the duties that the agency can assign ALJs,142 restricting 
his unelected subordinates to do what they ought to do without persuasion. In its 
pursuit of a ‘workable government,’ Congress cannot reduce the Chief Magistrate 
to a cajoler-in-chief.” (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted)).
134 See supra Part II.B.
135 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 
ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 280 (1994) (discussed in Moliterno, supra note 60, at nn.94 & 
108); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and 
the Value of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 499 (1986) (“Evidence 
suggests that various agencies have used the possibility of removal as a tool for 
coercing decisions that are consistent with the agency’s wishes.”); see also Redish 
& Marshall, supra, at 477 (“[I]f the adjudicator is himself an integral part of the 
governmental body on the other side of the case, then it is likely that his decision 
will be based on considerations other than the merits as developed by the 
evidence.”).
136 Gedid, supra note 123, at 40 (citing Pillai, supra note 2, at 124–25).
137 See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text.
138 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
139 Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1222 n.150.
140 Bruff, supra note 47, at 350.
141 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d)(1), 557(d) (2006).
142 Id. § 554(d)(2).
670 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-2
those who can directly supervise ALJs,143 restricting the agencies’ 
ability to award “merit” pay or provide a performance rating,144 and 
expressly requiring ALJs to act impartially.145
Indeed, indicia of independence may be irrelevant to, or at 
least unnecessary for, impartiality. Only nine percent of non-SSA 
ALJs report feeling pressured to rule differently.146 And 
administrative judges (“AJs”), who lack ALJs’ structural protections 
and preside over informal administrative adjudications,147 had less 
anxiety over their impartiality and independence than ALJs.148
Surely, the argument goes, the APA’s statutory protections and 
statistical evidence satisfy the minimal standards of due process, 
especially in light of the Supreme Court’s ready acceptance of most 
administrative procedures149 and the indication from the AJs’ 
responses that independence has little effect on an administrative 
adjudicator’s self-perception of impartiality.
2. Reassessing Existing Doctrine
Not surprisingly, scholars have disagreed as to whether ALJs 
have sufficient indicia of impartiality.150 Despite the absence of 
143 Id.
144 Id. § 5372.
145 Id. § 556(b) (“The functions of presiding employees . . . shall be 
conducted in an impartial manner.”).
146 Moliterno, supra note 60, at n.108 (citing Koch, supra note 135, at 
278).
147 See, e.g., Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Courts?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 227, 
262 & n.249 (2008) (citing RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AND PROCESS 309 (4th ed. 2004)) (stating that informal adjudication is often 
presided over by AJs with lower pay and less independence from the agency).
148 See Koch, supra note 135, at 279. If ALJs lack sufficient indicia of 
independence, then impartiality concerns over AJs, who lack ALJs’ protections, 
would be even graver and threaten much of the federal administrative state. 
Moreover, such a conclusion would also seem to bring Article I judges’ 
impartiality into question because they have independence that is similar to ALJs. 
Although certain concerns underlying my proposal also apply to AJs and Article I 
judges, I do not include them here because they do not likely face the same 
Appointments Clause problems and because other factual distinctions exist 
between them and ALJs.
149 Verkuil, supra note 6, at 1347–51. 
150 Compare, e.g., Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 4 n.11 (“[T]he APA
protections insulate ALJs far more than due process dictates.”), McNeil, supra note 
127, at 511 (“[D]ue process jurisprudence . . . [dispels] the notion that the measure 
of due process to which litigants are entitled in administrative proceedings includes 
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scholarly consensus, Professor Harold Bruff has stated that “the 
Supreme Court has upheld this general arrangement against due 
process attack.”151 Three Supreme Court decisions routinely come to 
the APA’s defense in a Constitution-based impartiality challenge: 
Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference,152 Butz v. 
Economou,153 and Withrow v. Larkin.154 Although certain of these 
decisions strongly suggest that ALJs are sufficiently impartial in fact 
and appearance, scholars have not considered the impact of the 
decisions’ limitations, especially after Caperton and Free Enterprise 
Fund.
an independent adjudicator possessed of salary and tenure protection . . . .”), and 
Verkuil, supra note 6, at 1347–51 (arguing that ALJs need only so much 
independence as to ensure their impartiality and suggesting that impartiality exists), 
with 2 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 442–43 (1959) (contending that 
relationship between agency and ALJ creates actual and apparent bias), Gedid,
supra note 123, at 40 (“[T]here is a strong argument that . . . for ALJ independence 
to exist, the ALJ cannot be ‘beholden’ to the agency for which she works for 
compensation, tenure, and/or conditions of employment.” (citing Richard B. 
Hoffman & Frank P. Cihlar, Judicial Independence: Can It Be Without Article III?,
46 MERCER L. REV. 863, 864–65 (1995))), Levinson, supra note 25, at 537–38
(noting uncertainty as to ALJs’ impartiality), Lubbers, supra note 2, at 110 (stating 
that “ALJs . . . are subject to doubts about their independence due in part to their 
employment,” but not resolving whether ALJs are sufficiently independent or 
impartial), Redish & Marshall, supra note 135, at 499, 504 (arguing that ALJs need 
salary and tenure protection similar or identical to Article III judges to preserve due 
process), Timony, supra note 2, at 828 (concluding that agencies’ ability to proceed 
against an ALJ creates an “appearance of impropriety”), and Karen Y. Kauper, 
Note, Protecting the Independence of Administrative Law Judges: A Model 
Administrative Law Judge Corps Statute, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 537, 544 
(1985). 
151 Bruff, supra note 47, at 346 (referring to Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 
35 (1975)); id. at 347 (“Most administrative adjudication is not very vulnerable to 
constitutional invalidation under the due process clause.”); see also Verkuil, supra
note 6, at 1350–51.
152 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
153 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
154 421 U.S. 35 (1975). In Weiss v. United States, the Supreme Court 
upheld the use of military judges despite their lack of a fixed term in office or 
lifetime tenure. See 510 U.S. 163, 179–81 (1994). But Weiss’s applicability to the 
civil administrative state is indeterminate. On one hand, the Court’s opinion
suggests that lifetime or termed tenure is unnecessary for adjudicators who are 
subject to removal by the executive branch. On the other hand, the Court refused to 
apply Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), because that case applied in civil 
contexts, suggesting that Mathews’s three-part balancing test may require more.
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Ramspeck, for instance, has limited relevance. In Ramspeck,
ALJs challenged certain rules governing ALJs, which the precursor 
to the OPM and the MSPB (the Civil Service Commission) 
promulgated under the APA.155 No constitutional question was posed 
or answered. In rejecting the ALJs’ contention that reductions in 
force were impermissible under the APA, the Court stated that 
Congress intended ALJs “not to be paid, promoted, or discharged at 
the whim or caprice of the agency or for political reasons.”156 And 
the Court referred to ALJs as “partially independent”157 and “semi-
independent subordinate hearing officers.”158 But these descriptions 
of congressional intent do not answer whether Congress successfully 
effectuated its intent, whether the protections provide sufficient 
impartiality, or whether the protections offend the President’s 
supervisory power.
The two remaining cases, however, are more germane. In 
Butz, an individual brought suit against certain Department of 
Agriculture officials who took part in an administrative 
adjudication.159 He asserted several causes of action, including those 
premised on violations of the Due Process Clause.160 The sole issue 
that the Supreme Court resolved concerned the nature of immunity to 
which the various officials were entitled.161 As in Ramspeck, the 
Court did not decide whether ALJs have sufficient impartiality, but it 
hinted as much. In determining that ALJs were entitled to absolute 
judicial immunity, the Court stated that ALJs were “functionally 
comparable” to judges162 and listed the APA’s panoply of protections 
to “guarantee [ALJs’] independence.”163 Indeed, absolute immunity 
“preserv[ed ALJs’] independent judgment.”164 Nevertheless, the 
decision does not discuss (at least in any detail) the power of removal 
155 See Ramspeck, 345 U.S. at 134 (outlining the arguments of each party).
156 Id. at 142.
157 Id. at 131.
158 Id. at 132.
159 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 481–82 (1978).
160 See id. at 482–83.
161 See id. at 485 (rejecting the United States’ argument that federal 
officials are immune from damages liability even if the violation was knowing, was 
deliberate, and infringed constitutional rights).
162 Id. at 513; accord Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. 
Supp. 1132, 1141 (D.D.C. 1984).
163 Butz, 438 U.S. at 514.
164 Id.
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and the internal pressures that weigh on ALJs as agency officials 
despite the powerful force that the Free Enterprise Fund Court would 
later understand the removal power to have,165 much less explain 
why the APA’s protections are sufficient to ensure impartiality.
Withrow likewise suggests that ALJs have sufficient 
impartiality, but it, too, is not dispositive. In Withrow, a doctor 
challenged the ability of a licensing board to preside over a 
nonadversary, investigatory hearing and also a later adversary, merits 
hearing.166 The Court unanimously upheld the arrangement. The 
Court noted that it sought to “prevent even the probability of 
unfairness”167 and that a challenge to the administrative structure 
would have to “overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in 
those serving as adjudicators,”168 in light of “a realistic appraisal of 
psychological tendencies and human weakness.”169 But the Court 
found no problem because the board was merely determining 
whether a full hearing was necessary, much like a judicial officer 
rendering a probable cause determination, without deciding whether 
a regulatory violation actually occurred.170 And the Court indicated 
that the Due Process Clause does not require separated investigative 
and adjudicatory functions for agency members.171
Withrow does not fully address the plight of ALJs. The 
Court’s opinion, like that in Butz, does not address the effect of the 
removal power on an adjudicator’s impartiality. Indeed, it does not 
address ALJs at all. Instead, Withrow concerns the heads of 
agencies.172
Perhaps one might argue that if agency heads can investigate, 
prosecute, adjudicate, and overrule ALJs’ opinions in toto, there 
should be little concern over their subordinates’ impartiality. But that 
argument overlooks ALJs’ functional judicial status and the different 
expectations that parties have before a judge as opposed to an agency 
165 See supra Part II.B (discussing significance of Free Enterprise Fund).
166 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 39–41 (1975).
167 Id. at 47.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 See id. at 53–58 (explaining why board’s behavior was acceptable). 
171 See id. at 52 (explaining that case law, and federal and state courts, 
support this contention).
172 See id. at 55 n.20 (noting that the Agency employee actually performed 
the investigation and an assistant attorney general presented the evidence to the 
board).
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member.173 The ALJ is a neutral individual whose opinion the agency 
must review, and the ALJ’s neutrality and opinion have a meaningful 
procedural and substantive effect. Although the agency can (but 
rarely does) reverse an ALJ’s decision, the substance of the ALJ’s 
opinion may matter for judicial review under the APA. The courts 
will review only agency decisions adverse to a nonagency party 
(because if the party prevails before the agency, the agency will not 
appeal its own adverse decision, which it has the power to reverse, to 
the courts). The ALJ’s opinion—especially as to facts and 
credibility—helps the court determine the matter with the additional 
help of an educated neutral’s view.174 The ALJ’s proceedings and 
opinion also provide an administrative procedure to help protect 
fundamental rights in adjudication and thereby create for the parties 
the reasonable expectation of a fair, impartial proceeding. In short, 
the ALJ’s place within the federal administrative apparatus does not 
mean that impartiality and its concomitant indicia of independence 
are irrelevant.
173 The Withrow Court also referred to Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 
389, 410 (1971). See Withrow, 421 U.S. at 49–50. In Perales, the Supreme Court 
rejected a social security claimant’s argument that the ALJ’s duty to develop the 
record in nonadversarial hearings violated the Due Process Clause. The Court held 
that doing so would “assume[] too much and would bring down too many 
procedures designed, and working well, for a governmental structure of great and 
growing complexity.” See Perales, 402 U.S. at 410. This conclusion is sound 
because the ALJ was not an advocate for the Agency; the Agency was 
unrepresented. But the Perales Court’s reasoning is not satisfying. The Court 
merely offers unsupported conclusions that (1) the procedures are “working well” 
and (2) the procedures satisfy due process because the government, which creates, 
implements, and potentially benefits from the procedures, has made them 
ubiquitous. See id. Moreover, like Butz and Withrow, Perales does not address 
whether a sharp Damoclean sword of removal dulls the ALJ’s impartiality. Perhaps 
the better support for sufficient impartiality is found in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254, 271 (1970) (“We agree . . . that prior involvement in some aspects of a case 
will not necessarily bar a welfare official from acting as a decision maker.”).
174 See, e.g., Novelty, Inc. v. DEA, 571 F.3d 1176, 1180–81 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (Henderson, J., concurring) (“The DEA is the ultimate fact finder but ‘[t]he 
agency's departures from the [ALJ’s] findings are vulnerable if they fail to reflect 
attentive consideration to the [ALJ’s] decision.’ ” (quoting Greater Bos. Tel. Corp. 
v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1970))); Bos. Edison Co. v. FERC, 885 F.2d 
962, 968–69 (1st Cir. 1989); see infra note 195 (explaining that courts carefully 
view agency findings contrary to ALJ factual findings).
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3. Caperton and Free Enterprise Fund’s Impact on Existing Doctrine
Even if Ramspeck, Butz, and Withrow together established 
that ALJs have sufficient impartiality, the Court’s more recent 
decision in Caperton may suggest otherwise. Indeed, Caperton does 
what those decisions did not: it focuses on adjudicators’ selection and 
removal, albeit in the judicial-election context. In Caperton, the 
president of a corporate defendant, which was in the process of 
appealing an unfavorable verdict, had contributed three million 
dollars to have Justice Benjamin elected to the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals.175 Justice Benjamin defeated the 
incumbent justice by fewer than fifty thousand votes.176 In response 
to recusal motions, Justice Benjamin said that he had no actual bias 
and that there was no allegation of a quid pro quo arrangement.177
The U.S. Supreme Court held that due process required 
Justice Benjamin’s recusal.178 Evidence of a quid pro quo agreement 
or of actual bias was unnecessary.179 Instead, the Court was 
“concerned with a more general concept of interests that tempt 
adjudicators to disregard neutrality.”180 The Court was looking not 
necessarily for Withrow’s “probability of unfairness,”181 but instead 
an “unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’ ”182 The Court suggested 
that such bias exists 
“when a person with a personal stake in a particular 
case had a significant and disproportionate influence 
in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or 
175 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873 (2009).
176 See id. (noting Justice Benjamin received 382,036 votes while his rival 
received 334,301 votes).
177 See id. at 872–75, 886 (reviewing facts of case).
178 See id. at 884–87 (explaining reasons for holding).
179 See id. at 884–85 (arguing that risk of bias was substantial enough).
180 Id. at 878.
181 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
182 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 
U.S. 455, 465–66 (1971)). The Court enunciated another standard besides the 
“probability of unfairness” and the “unconstitutional potential for bias.” The Court 
also indicated that it was looking for “the probability of actual bias [that] rises to an 
unconstitutional level.” Id. at 887. Perhaps these three standards can be reconciled. 
The “probability of actual bias” may be the same as the “probability of unfairness,” 
with the unfairness being the actual bias. The “potential for bias” may be 
unconstitutional only when it rises to the level of the probability of actual bias.
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directing the judge’s election campaign when the case 
was pending or imminent. . . . [S]imilar fears of bias 
can arise when—without the other parties’ consent—a
man chooses the judge in his own cause.”183
 
Applying this standard, the Court noted that the president of the 
defendant-corporation knew that the appeal from an unfavorable 
verdict was pending, the election was decided by fewer than fifty 
thousand votes, and the president’s contributions had a significant 
and disproportionate impact on the election.184 Because of this, the 
Court found “a serious, objective risk of actual bias that required 
Justice Benjamin’s recusal” because it appeared that the defendant 
“ch[ose] the judge in [its] own cause.”185
Although the Court discussed its decision within the judicial-
election context,186 its reasoning seems even more compelling when 
applied to ALJs. Caperton appears to consider a party’s impact on a 
judge’s selection and perhaps the effect that a losing party could have 
to punish the judge who it helped place on the bench in future 
judicial elections. West Virginia voters directly chose Justice 
Benjamin. Nevertheless, the corporate defendant’s disproportionate 
contributions’ indirect impact on the election created an 
“unconstitutional potential for bias.” The government, like the 
defendant in Caperton, is frequently a party to proceedings before the 
ALJ. But the government directly chooses the ALJ from a list of 
three candidates presented to it. If agencies obtain the ability to 
engage in selective certification, their ability to appoint is even more 
unbounded. In either case, the agency directly and literally “chooses 
the judge in [its] own cause,” without, as in the case of federal 
judges, any approval from another branch. Moreover, the agency is 
the party that can initiate removal proceedings against the ALJ, not 
merely indirectly fund opposition forces in a later election. Indeed, it 
is not even the government in general that selects ALJs and initiates 
removal proceedings; it is the very agency that appears before the 
ALJ. Because the agency’s role in selecting and removing the ALJ is 
much more direct than in Caperton, it is difficult to see how an 
183 Id. at 870.
184 Id. at 885–86.
185 Id. at 886, 902.
186 Id. at 881–82 (“This problem arises in the context of judicial elections, 
a framework not presented in the precedents we have reviewed and discussed.”).
Fall 2013 Resolving the ALJ Quandary 677
“unconstitutional potential for bias” does not exist for federal ALJs if 
Caperton applies outside of the judicial-election context.
Moreover, as discussed previously in Part II.B, Free 
Enterprise Fund suggests that the President must have sufficient 
supervisory power over all members of the executive branch so that 
the President can be held accountable for what his or her agents do. 
To ensure the President’s supervisory power, the Court has begun 
limiting tenure protections for executive officials, such as the 
PCAOB members.187 If the Court were to follow suit with ALJs and 
permit the President or a principal officer to remove ALJs for any 
reason, it is difficult to see how an “unconstitutional potential for 
bias,” or indeed a “probability of actual bias” would not exist. The 
President or a supervising officer could, despite potential political 
backlash, have the ALJ find facts or apply law in certain ways. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that “one who holds his office
only during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to 
maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.”188 A
challenge to the President’s supervision of ALJs may not be merely a 
theoretical matter, given the Court’s recent, solicitous reception to 
separation-of-powers challenges.189
Functional limitations on the President’s supervisory power—
such as the understood ability of ALJs to act without agency 
interference190 and ALJs’ APA protections—may be less, if at all, 
relevant to due process and removal-power inquiries after Free 
Enterprise Fund. That decision strongly suggests that practical 
indicia of independence or control are normally immaterial to the 
187 See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010) 
(agreeing with the government that unconstitutional tenure provisions are 
severable). 
188 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
189 See generally Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) (holding that 
bankruptcy court lacked authority under Article III to enter judgment on state-law 
counterclaim); Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3150–51 (deciding separation-of-
powers issues on interlocutory review); Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182–
83 (1995) (discussing claim, based on Appointments Clause of Article II of the 
Constitution, that there was a “ ‘trespass upon the executive power of appointment’ 
”).
190 See supra note 140 and accompanying text; cf., e.g., Russell L. 
Weaver, Management of ALJ Offices in Executive Departments and Agencies, 47 
ADMIN. L. REV. 303, 321 (1995) (“ALJs who serve at agencies that have non-ALJ
administrators repeatedly indicated that those administrators have not attempted to 
interfere with their decisional independence.”).
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President’s removal-power inquiry because the Court rejected Justice 
Breyer’s functional inquiry that considered other, more meaningful 
methods of presidential control, such as rulemaking powers.191
Instead, the Court looked only to the President’s removal power and 
held that the lack of sufficient removal power in the PCAOB scheme 
alone impeded the President’s supervisory power.192 Supervision is 
merely the flipside to independence. If the removal power is 
significant and apparently necessary for adequate presidential 
supervision, the removal power should have a similar, inverse impact 
on independence and impartiality. The limited ability of Congress 
after Free Enterprise Fund to rely on functional methods of control 
and independence is what, in part, may render the ALJ’s quandary so 
difficult to solve.
Finally, the agency’s ability to overrule an ALJ on both fact 
and law does not mean that an ALJ’s decision is meaningless.193 The 
ALJ’s credibility findings can be very significant, affecting whether 
substantial evidence exists for an agency’s contrary decision on 
administrative appeal.194 Indeed, courts review with a more careful 
eye agency findings that are contrary to ALJs’ factual findings.195
Considering appellate courts’ more deferential review of final agency 
action as compared to lower court factual findings,196 ALJs’ 
191 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155–56 (refuting dissent’s 
position); id. at 3170–73 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing how the SEC controls 
PCAOB’s adjudicatory and rulemaking authority). 
192 See id. at 3158–59 (discussing threat posed by insufficient removal 
power); see also id. at 3156–57 (discussing Framers’ view of importance of 
removal power).
193 See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006) (describing ALJ’s initial decision 
authority); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 494–97 (1951) 
(explaining importance of findings of examiner); Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1225 
(acknowledging weight of authority given to ALJ decisions).
194 See Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 496–97 (noting legislative 
committee reports emphasize importance of ALJ decisions); see also Penasquitos 
Vill., Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1079–81 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusing to enforce 
NLRB’s order and reversing an ALJ’s determination that relied exclusively on 
testimony that the ALJ discredited). 
195 Penasquitos Vill, Inc., 565 F.2d at 1078 (referring to NLRB v. Tom 
Johnson, Inc., 378 F.2d 342, 344 (9th Cir. 1967), and NLRB v. Interboro 
Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 499 (2d Cir. 1967)).
196 See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162–63 (1999) (explaining that 
the “ ‘substantial evidence’ standard [for review of agency decisions] . . . is 
somewhat less strict than the [clearly erroneous standard for the review of lower 
court factual findings]”); accord Chen v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 
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impartiality may be even more important than Article III judges’ 
impartiality.
Despite concerns over ALJ impartiality and despite Caperton 
and Free Enterprise Fund’s contrary suggestion, the Supreme Court 
may not find a due process violation, given its wariness of upsetting 
long-standing administrative practices.197 But the absence of 
constitutional infirmity does not mean that the current administrative 
system is in excellent health. These concerns, like those that surround 
ALJs’ selection and removal, support finding a new process of ALJ 
selection and removal that all interested constituencies can champion.
III. OTHER PROPOSED, YET INCOMPLETE, REFORMS
Scholars and ALJs have proposed various changes to ALJs’ 
selection, removal, and independence. Some of the most promising 
proposals, discussed below, include the creation of a unified ALJ 
corps with a newly established supervising agency, ALJ self-
regulation, and even the provision of Article III protections to ALJs. 
But these proposals fail to consider, much less resolve, all three 
separation-of-powers issues surrounding ALJs. Each of these 
proposals thus has—befitting ALJs’ current demigod status—an 
Achilles heel.198
A. Unified Corps
Perhaps the most popular remedial proposal is for a unified 
ALJ corps (sometimes referred to as an ALJ central panel), appointed 
and supervised by an existing or newly created independent 
agency.199 Under this proposal, ALJs are not appointed by or 
2007) (“The substantial evidence standard . . . is more deferential than the ‘clearly 
erroneous’ standard . . . .”). 
197 See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971).
198 In fairness to these proposals’ advocates, I am not aware of any 
scholarship that directly examines all three problems. Moreover, the problematic 
nature of the ALJs’ tiered-tenure protections, among other things, did not arise in 
any substantial way until June 2010 with Free Enterprise Fund.
199 See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 2, at 123–24 (discussing intensified 
movement for a unified administrative trial court or centralized corps of judges); 
Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1227–33 (articulating support that the proposal for a 
central panel has received); Scalia, supra note 92, at 79 (explaining improper 
influence issue could be resolved with a unified ALJ corps). Similarly, the Federal 
ALJ Conference has proposed transferring the OPM’s selection assistance of ALJs 
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assigned to a specific agency. Instead, a corps of ALJs, whose 
members an independent agency appoints, hears cases from various 
agencies.200 Some of the central-panel proposals would permit ALJs 
to issue final decisions.201
A federal ALJ corps, however, does not likely resolve the 
three separation-of-powers concerns. The independent agency’s 
appointment of ALJs would likely comply with the Appointments 
Clause because the independent agency, if “not subordinate to or 
contained within any other [executive] component,” would constitute 
a “department.”202 But the presidential-supervision concerns remain 
because, without further changes to the current appointment process, 
two tiers of tenure protections would continue to shield ALJs from 
the President’s control. The appointing agency would be independent 
because of tenure protection for its head.203 And ALJs presumably 
would likewise receive the tenure protection that they currently 
possess.204 If one or both of the tenure-protection provisions are 
invalidated, substantial due process concerns may exist because the 
new appointing and removing agency—which may not be 
and other responsibilities to a new independent agency, the Administrative Law 
Judge Conference. See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 105–07 (discussing history and 
reasons for proposal); see also Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 38–40 
(suggesting creation of an independent oversight agency and discussing 
California’s Agency that oversees judicial conduct). But doing so would not 
address any of the three stated concerns because it merely transfers currently 
existing powers from one independent agency—that ALJs think has generally 
ignored them—to another more sympathetic one. This transfer does not have heads
of departments actually appoint ALJs, alter the President’s supervisory power, or 
address ALJ independence.
200 See McNeil, supra note 127, at 480 (pointing out consistency of 
independence of ALJs with due process requirements); Jim Rossi, Overcoming 
Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN.
L. REV. 551, 568 (2001) (describing how corps of ALJs promotes adjudicative 
independence).
201 See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1230 (comparing a central panel of 
ALJs to Article III judges).
202 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (defining “department”). 
203 See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667, 701 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[Independent agency] is the term that 
traditionally has been applied . . . to agencies . . . whose heads are not removable at 
will.”), rev’d 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
204 See 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006) (listing possible actions against ALJs); 
MODEL ACT CREATING A STATE CENTRAL HEARING AGENCY § 1–6(a)(3), (a)(4) 
(1997) (listing reasons for removal).
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independent after a tiered-tenure-protection analysis—may attempt to 
influence ALJs’ decisions improperly.205 Moreover, even if the 
tenure protections are permissible under Article II, any attempt to 
give ALJs the power to issue final decisions places policy control 
within the ALJs, not the agencies themselves, and thus limits the 
President’s ability to ensure that the law is faithfully executed.206
Yet, even if an ALJ central panel did cure all three problems, 
a federal ALJ corps is not likely in the offing. Numerous states have 
created ALJ corps,207 which have received universal praise.208 Many 
members of the committee that proposed the federal APA to 
Congress advocated an ALJ corps.209 And since then, many scholars, 
committees, members of the bar, a congressman, and ALJs have 
joined the unsuccessful crusade.210 Even so, by 1992 the 
205 See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text (explaining probable 
bias that may occur if President could remove ALJs for any reason); see also 
Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Special Problems of State Administrative Law Judges, 53 
ADMIN. L. REV. 403, 417 (2001) (proposing that ALJ corps is “removable only for 
good cause and, then, only after notice and an opportunity to be heard by an 
impartial tribunal”); Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 45 (explaining that ALJs in 
certain states, such as Texas, can be removed at will by the Chief ALJ).
206 Cf. Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, ALJ Independence, and 
Administrative Courts: The Recent Changes in Louisiana’s Administrative 
Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REV. 431, 463 (1999) (noting separation-of-powers 
problems that arose when Louisiana permitted ALJs to issue final decisions from 
which a losing agency could not appeal).
207 Rossi, supra note 200, at 568; see Patricia E. Salkin, Judging Ethics for 
Administrative Law Judges: Adoption of a Uniform Code of Judicial Conduct for 
the Administrative Judiciary, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 7, 13 n.18 (2002) (listing 
twenty-four states that have adopted central panels).
208 See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1229 (citing Thomas E. Ewing,
Oregon’s Hearing Officer Panel, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 57, 89 
(2003); Allen C. Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 
1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 75, 78 (1994); Bruce H. Johnson, Strengthening 
Professionalism Within an Administrative Hearing Office: The Minnesota 
Experience, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 446 (2001)). Nonetheless, a common criticism 
of the ALJ corps is that agencies lose the efficiency and specialized knowledge that 
exists when ALJs are housed within individual agencies. See, e.g., Pierce, supra
note 57, at 516.
209 See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1227.
210 See Lubbers, supra note 2, at 123–24 (explaining the LaMacchia
Committee’s 1973 recommendation for study of an ALJ corps and former ABA 
President Bernard Segal’s advocacy for an independent ALJ corps in 1976); id. at 
124 (advocating “increased scrutiny” for the ALJ corps proposal); Moliterno, supra
note 60, at 1229 (collecting scholarly and ALJ proposals); see also GAO-10-14, 
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Administrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS”) 
recommended that Congress not create an ALJ corps.211 Given the 
ACUS’s lack of support for an ALJ corps and the proposal’s failure 
to gain political traction after more than sixty years, the proposal to 
create a federal ALJ corps appears moribund.
B. Self-Regulation
Another set of proposals grants ALJs the power to self-
regulate. Other professions, such as Article III judges, lawyers, and 
physicians, regulate the conduct of their members.212 Indeed, because 
Federal Judicial Councils monitor judicial behavior, Congress has 
largely avoided regulating judges.213 Under one general proposal, 
ALJs would be permitted to create an ethics code,214 investigate 
alleged ALJ wrongdoing, and impose sanctions for inappropriate 
conduct.215 Under another self-regulation proposal, a new 
independent agency of ALJs would assume the OPM’s current ALJ-
selection-assistance duties, improve the formal administrative 
adjudicatory process, and ensure compliance with ethical 
standards.216
These proposals do not address appointment, removal, or 
impartiality concerns. Neither proposal alters ALJs’ current 
questionable method of selection by heads of agencies who are not 
heads of departments. Neither appears to alter ALJs’ two tiers of 
tenure protection or the existing removal mechanisms, and thus 
supra note 40, at 22 (“The ALJ Corps option was proposed repeatedly in Congress 
between 1983 and 1995.”); Scalia, supra note 92, at 79 (discussing ALJ corps’s 
beneficial effect on efficiency and likely detrimental effect on accountability and 
supervision); Timony, supra note 2, at 819 (discussing Senator Heflin’s 1983 bill 
to create a unified corps). 
211 See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1228 (referring to PAUL R. VERKUIL 
ET AL., ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY
1059 (1992)).
212 Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 43–45.
213 Id. at 43.
214 ALJs’ unsettled ethical duties are a perennial subject of academic 
discussion. See generally Salkin, supra note 207, at 7–32; Ronnie A. Yoder, The 
Role of the Administrative Law Judge, 22 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 321, 
321–48 (2002); Diana Gillis, Note, Closing an Administrative Loophole: Ethics for 
the Administrative Judiciary, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 863, 863–76 (2009).
215 Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 43.
216 See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 106–07.
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neither proposal gives the ALJs more than the power to recommend 
or impose certain adverse action against a derelict ALJ. Because 
ALJs’ selection and removal are essentially left unaltered under both 
proposals, self-regulation would have a minimal impact on 
impartiality concerns. The failure to consider the selection bias, the 
agency-view inculcation, and threat of removal renders the 
promulgation and enforcement of an ethics code an ineffective tool to 
improve actual and perceived ALJ impartiality.
C. Article III Protections
A third suggestion provides ALJs essentially the same tenure 
protections that Article III judges enjoy. To combat agency pressure
on ALJ decisionmaking, two prominent scholars have proposed 
giving ALJs lifetime salary protection and permitting their removal 
only through a statutory-impeachment process.217 This proposal 
should remedy any lingering due process concerns, even after 
Caperton and Free Enterprise Fund, because ALJs would have the 
same independence as Article III judges, although that independence 
would arise from statutory, not constitutional, law.218
But this proposal does not resolve appointment or supervision 
concerns. The proposal fails to alter ALJs’ selection, leaving heads of 
agencies, as opposed to departments, to select some ALJs.219
Moreover, it would exacerbate presidential-supervision concerns. To 
be sure, this reform would remove one tier of tenure protection and 
thus may, at a superficial level, solve the problem presented in Free 
Enterprise Fund. Yet removal through impeachment completely 
deprives the executive branch of power to seek an ALJ’s removal 
217 See Redish & Marshall, supra note 135, at 499; see also id. at 504 
(“[D]ue process is inadequately protected when an individual must depend on an 
adjudicator who lacks salary and tenure protection (such as most state court judges
and all ALJs) to protect an entitlement to a life, liberty, or property interest.”). 
Redish and Marshall’s proposal is vague as to whether the salary and tenure 
protections are lifetime protections. They do not use the term “lifetime,” but they 
do mention the protections and then state that “ALJs would then be shielded from 
such pressures in much the same way that article III judges are.” See id. at 499.
218 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. But others have concluded that Article III 
protections are unnecessary under due process jurisprudence. See McNeil, supra
note 127, at 511; Daniel J. Meltzer, The Judiciary’s Bicentennial, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 423, 433 (1989) (suggesting that salary and tenure protections may render 
judges more political, not apolitical).
219 See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
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because the House of Representatives, not the executive branch, 
initiates impeachment proceedings.220 Thus, even if this proposal 
resolves due process concerns, it leaves unaddressed Appointments 
Clause problems and presidential-supervision difficulties of the 
highest magnitude.
IV. AN INTERBRANCH-APPOINTMENT REMEDY
These proposals, even if incomplete or politically unpalatable, 
demonstrate the widespread sense that ALJs are not operating, to 
paraphrase Voltaire’s Dr. Pangloss, in the best of all possible 
worlds.221 In the spirit of creating a better administrative world, I 
propose that Congress assign the power to appoint (and the incidental 
power to discipline and remove) ALJs to the “Courts of Law,” 
namely the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. I first briefly 
outline the key portions of my statutory proposal for the D.C. Circuit 
to appoint and discipline ALJs. I then further explain why I have 
structured the proposal as I have to resolve the three constitutional 
questions and address agencies’ and ALJs’ concerns. Although, as 
discussed above, other structural proposals have tended to disappear 
into the political ether, my proposal may be able to gain more 
traction because it gives, through a relatively simple statutory 
change, both agencies and ALJs some, but not all, of what they want.
A. General Mechanics of an ALJ Interbranch Appointment
Under a new statute and its implementing rules, the D.C. 
Circuit should appoint, discipline, and remove ALJs. The court has 
the knowledge, time, and logistics to do so. It is widely considered 
220 If the proposed statutory impeachment models constitutional 
impeachment, the House of Representatives would impeach ALJs, and the Senate 
would preside over the trial and decide whether to convict. See U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 4; art. I, §§ 2–3. The President has no role in the impeachment process. Although 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 483–85 (1886), held 
that Congress could limit the incidental removal power when a department head 
appoints an inferior officer, the removal of the cadet-engineer in Perkins had to 
proceed through a court martial, an organ of the executive branch. It is far from 
clear that Congress could permit a department head to appoint and then usurp the 
removal power through a statutory-impeachment process, leaving the President or 
department head without any role in the sole removal process.
221 See e.g., VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 84 (ch.1, ll. 42–44) (Librairie Nizet 
1959) (1759).
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the most influential court on matters of administrative law, routinely 
reviewing numerous important administrative law cases, including 
ALJs’ decisions.222 The court also has a substantially lighter caseload 
than all other federal circuits.223 With the administrative assistance of 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (“AOC”), its 
judges have the capacity for the administrative duty of selecting and 
disciplining ALJs. The Circuit also has the added benefit of a prime 
222 See, e.g., GORDON BERMANT ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE CASES 
OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
CIRCUIT 3–4 (1982) (estimating that forty-five percent of “high burden agency 
cases” are filed in the D.C. Circuit); John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the 
D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 553, 554 (2010) (“[T]he D.C. Circuit . . . hears a disproportionate share of 
the United States’ administrative law cases.”) (citing John G. Roberts, Jr., What 
Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375, 376–77
(2006) (“One-third of the D.C. Circuit appeals are from agency decisions. That 
figure is less than twenty percent nationwide.”)); Richard L. Revesz, Congressional 
Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of Challenges to 
Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1103 n.14 (2001) 
(citing Harold H. Bruff, Coordinating Judicial Review in Administrative Law, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1202 (1992); Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are 
Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 621 
& n.2 (1994)) (noting that D.C. Circuit decides nearly one-third of all direct 
appeals from federal agencies). 
223 The D.C. Circuit decided 173 cases on the merits per active judge in 
2010. In comparison, the national average was 459. Relatively small circuits 
decided more cases on the merits per judge: 502 for the Eighth Circuit, 415 for the 
First Circuit, and 242 for the Tenth Circuit. See Federal Court Management 
Statistics December 2010: Courts of Appeals, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsa2010Dec.pl (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2012) (select circuit for report at prompt); see also Susan Low Bloch & 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th Anniversary of the Federal Courts of 
the District of Columbia, 90 GEO. L.J. 549, 562 n.63 (2002) (referring to Jonathan 
Groner, Circuit Pick Caught in the Middle: GOP Senator Questions Need to Fill 
Vacancy, LEGAL TIMES, June 1, 2000, at 1); John B. Oakley, Precedent in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals: An Endangered or Invasive Species, 8 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 123, 126 (2006). Indeed, the relatively light caseload may explain what 
some view as the D.C. Circuit’s “unusually intrusive approach to administrative 
law.” See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Comment, Legislative Reform of Judicial Review of 
Agency Actions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1110, 1126 (1995). Although some have attributed 
the D.C. Circuit’s smaller caseload to the complexity of its cases, see, e.g., Bruff, 
supra note 222, at 1236, I am skeptical. In my admittedly anecdotal experience, 
death-penalty, prisoner-rights, and habeas cases can be extremely time-consuming, 
with large records and inadequate briefing. The D.C. Circuit hears few of these 
cases. See U.S. COURTS, supra (select D.C. Circuit at prompt). 
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location. Like numerous ALJs, most agencies, and the AOC, the D.C. 
Circuit is based in D.C.
The selection process could proceed much in the same way 
that it does now. ALJ candidates could continue to take the 
preliminary examination that the OPM currently administers under 
the D.C. Circuit’s auspices, with the AOC’s administrative 
support.224 After the examination, with the AOC’s assistance, the 
D.C. Circuit could then assign each candidate a score based on his or 
her examination, experience, and qualifications, much as the OPM 
does now.225 Through a notice-and-comment procedure that the 
courts of appeals currently use for bankruptcy-judge candidates,226
the court could then solicit comments on the three highest-scoring 
candidates. The agency for which the ALJ would work would, like 
other interested parties, be able to provide comments and indicate its 
preferred candidate from one of the three candidates.
But the agency, unlike other interested parties, could also 
submit its own candidate and thereby create a roster of four 
candidates.227 If the agency submits a candidate for consideration, 
interested parties could then provide comments on the agency’s 
submitted candidate. After considering the examination and the 
received comments, the D.C. Circuit would appoint the ALJ from the 
list of three or four candidates, under what I refer to as a new “Rule 
of Three or Four.” Each agency would retain the authority to 
determine the number of ALJs that it needs.228
224 See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
225 See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
226 See, e.g., Official Notice, Sixth Circuit Judicial Council, Office of the 
Circuit Exec. (May 29, 2011), available at
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/documents/TNM_Public_Notice.pdf (request 
for comment on bankruptcy-judge candidates).
227 See GAO-10-14, supra note 40, at 9–10 (stating that agencies seek 
more influence over selection process, including ability to select candidates with 
specialized knowledge).
228 See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006). My proposal concerns the future 
appointment of ALJs. As for current ALJs, I would suggest “grandfathering” them 
into the new system by permitting the D.C. Circuit to appoint them summarily. See
35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2006) (prescribing a similar appointment process for improperly 
appointed administrative patent judges). This “grandfathering” would ease the 
administrative difficulties with appointing so many incumbent ALJs. But, as with 
other solutions to prior improper appointments, it would not resolve whether 
decisions made prior to D.C. Circuit’s appointment are valid. See id. § 6(d). 
Fall 2013 Resolving the ALJ Quandary 687
Agencies, among others, could request that the D.C. Circuit 
discipline or remove an ALJ for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance,” the same standard that governs bankruptcy judges229
and numerous other federal adjudicators.230 Per statute, any agency 
complaint concerning an ALJ would be placed on a “fast track” that 
requires the D.C. Circuit to decide the matter within two months. 
Prompt resolution would ensure that agencies are able to have 
incompetent or malfeasant ALJs removed promptly. Agencies would 
retain a right to suspend ALJs immediately when the agency 
“considers that action necessary in the interests of national security,” 
with limited judicial review.231 Other “interested parties,” as the term 
is understood under the APA (§ 554(c)), could also seek ALJs’ 
removal or discipline.232 The D.C. Circuit itself would have no power 
to discipline or remove an ALJ sua sponte.
By vesting the D.C. Circuit with appointment and removal 
power, the D.C. Circuit would become another actor responsible for 
ALJs. The D.C. Circuit would replace the MSPB’s role in removing 
and disciplining ALJs and the OPM’s and agencies’ role in hiring 
ALJs. Nevertheless, the OPM would continue to share 
responsibilities concerning increased ALJ pay, temporary 
assignments, and ensuring ALJ decisional independence. Indeed, 
because the AOC, not the OPM, would assist the D.C. Circuit with 
ALJ hiring, the OPM should be able to focus on ALJ performance 
and decisional independence.233
229 See 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2006).
230 See infra note 337 and accompanying text. Although the Court in 
Bowsher v. Synar suggested that removal under this provision could permit 
removal for “any number of actual or perceived transgressions,” 478 U.S. 714, 729 
(1986), the Court in Free Enterprise Fund suggested, without referring to Bowsher,
that the provision for removal provided only narrow grounds for removal, see Free 
Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157–58 (2010). These narrower grounds 
for removal limit the discretion of the removing party—here the D.C. Circuit—and 
thus limit the D.C. Circuit’s control or supervision over the ALJs.
231 See 5 U.S.C. § 7532. 
232 Agencies would still decide motions for ALJ bias. See id. § 556(b). If 
the court became inundated with frivolous motions from “interested parties” whom 
the ALJ likely ruled against, the Court, per statute, could adopt rules that permit 
single judges to decide whether a complaint is sufficiently substantial to be referred 
to a panel for decision. Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 27(c) (permitting single circuit judge to 
decide motions). 
233 Indeed, because many of the OPM’s and MSPB’s duties would be 
transferred to the AOC, federal administrative cost should remain approximately 
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As discussed below, these changes to ALJ selection will 
resolve (or at least substantially mitigate) the appointment, removal, 
and impartiality concerns discussed in Part II. Moreover, to Dr. 
Pangloss’s relief, this system will also provide a much better world, 
if not the best possible one, for ALJs and agencies even if the 
constitutional concerns above do not amount to constitutional 
violations.
B. Clarifying Limits on Interbranch Appointment and Removal
As described below, the D.C. Circuit’s appointment of ALJs 
is constitutional and resolves the appointment issue surrounding 
ALJs. Depending on whether ALJs are inferior officers or 
employees, the Appointments Clause’s text either permits my 
proposed interbranch appointment or is otherwise irrelevant. The 
Supreme Court has, however, limited Congress’s ability to permit the 
“Courts of Law” to appoint executive-branch officers under 
incongruous-appointment or separation-of-powers theories. Under 
these perhaps distinct but incestuous theories, the appointment must 
not improperly impede the functioning of the judicial and executive 
branches. Congress can very likely satisfy the inquiry if it vests the 
D.C. Circuit with the interbranch appointment of ALJs. As part of my 
analysis below, I propose a three-part inquiry to simplify and clarify 
the Court’s current, partially redundant, and vague incongruous-
appointment analysis.
1. The Appointments Clause
If ALJs are inferior officers, the Excepting Clause expressly 
permits Congress, “as [it] think[s] proper,” to vest their appointment 
in “Courts of Law.”234 The D.C. Circuit is a “Court[] of Law,”235 and 
the same. See Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 42 (discussing possible increased 
administrative costs that may arise from creating a new independent agency to 
oversee ALJs). Likewise, the direct judicial decision concerning ALJ discipline and 
removal—instead of judicial review of administrative action—should save 
administrative costs.
234 U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
235 See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 888–89 (1991) (holding that 
“Courts of Law” refer to legislative and Article III courts); Morrison v. Olson, 487 
U.S. 654, 678–80 (1988) (assuming that Special Division, comprised of Article III 
judges, was a “Court of Law”); Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 378 (1901) (holding 
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thus the Clause’s text expressly permits the D.C. Circuit to appoint 
ALJs.
Even if ALJs are instead employees, appointments by the 
D.C. Circuit should not offend the Constitution. The Supreme Court 
has been clear that the Appointments Clause does not apply to the 
appointment of employees and has thus suggested that Congress has 
wide latitude in deciding how employees are selected.236 Although 
Congress’s power to create interbranch-employee appointments is 
unresolved and has been rarely considered,237 Congress can likely 
create such appointments, subject at most to the same separation-of-
powers concerns surrounding interbranch-officer appointments.238
After all, even Congress’s enumerated and plenary power to create an 
administrative bureaucracy does not permit Congress to act in ways 
that trample upon the separation of powers.239 Courts can respect the 
that Congress could, under the Appointments Clause, vest appointment in “the 
[d]istrict or [c]ircuit courts”).
236 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 880 (“If we . . . conclude that a special trial judge 
is only an employee, petitioners’ challenge fails, for such ‘lesser functionaries’ 
need not be selected in compliance with the strict requirements of Article II.”).
237 I have uncovered only two papers that have, in limited fashion, 
discussed the topic. See Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power in Political and 
Corporate Contexts, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 277, 288–89 (2010); Emily E. 
Eineman, Note, Congressional Criminality and Balance of Powers: Are Internal 
Filter Teams Really What Our Forefathers Envisioned?, 16 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 595, 613 (2007). I have uncovered no relevant judicial decisions.
238 The fact that the Constitution provides express authority for only 
interbranch appointments of inferior officers, but not employees, should not be 
troubling. The Excepting Clause empowers and limits Congress. It allows Congress 
to use more efficient officer-appointment mechanisms, but it requires Congress to 
appoint officers in a manner expressly stated in the Appointments Clause. Compare 
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 673–75, with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133–36 (1976) 
(per curiam). The Necessary and Proper Clause should provide Congress all the 
authority that it needs to create interbranch-employee appointments when 
establishing the administrative state. The separation of powers (but not the 
Appointments Clause) provides the proper boundary for those appointments. Cf.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 135–36 (explaining that Necessary and Proper Clause does not 
permit Congress to ignore other constitutional limitations). The separation-of-
powers concerns should be very similar, if not identical, for employee and inferior-
officer appointments. In both instances, Congress cannot impair the central 
functioning of the judicial or executive branch by giving the former the 
appointment power. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691. 
239 See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155–56 (2010) 
(stating that Congress must account for presidential oversight in creating a “vast 
and varied federal bureaucracy”); Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public 
690 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-2
separation of powers in evaluating employee-selection schemes in the 
same manner as they do in assessing inferior-officer appointments—
that is, by considering the appointment method’s effect on both 
judicial and executive integrity, as discussed in Part IV.B.2. 
Accordingly, whether ALJs are ultimately deemed employees or 
officers, Congress’s interbranch-appointment powers should be 
equivalent, and the courts’ inquiry should account for the same 
underlying concerns.
2. Doctrinal Incongruity Limitations
Despite the fact that the Appointments Clause does not appear 
to forbid interbranch appointments, the Supreme Court has imposed 
limits on their use. After a false start in the mid-1800s, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that Congress has substantial discretion in 
creating interbranch appointments, so long as the appointment is 
neither incongruous nor offensive to the separation of powers. But, as 
I discuss below, this “incongruity” limitation is ill defined and 
partially redundant.
In 1839, the Court in Ex Parte Hennen appeared to condemn 
interbranch appointments. There, the Court upheld a district court’s 
appointment of a court clerk.240 Although the case did not involve an 
interbranch appointment, the Court stated that “[t]he appointing 
power . . . was no doubt intended to be exercised by the department 
of the government to which the officer to be appointed most 
appropriately belonged.”241
Forty years later, the Court substantially limited Hennen’s 
dictum. In Ex Parte Siebold, the Court upheld the judiciary’s 
interbranch appointment of election supervisors.242 Although the 
Court referred to Hennen in observing that “[i]t is no doubt usual and 
proper to vest the appointment of inferior officers in that department 
Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 316 (2002) (“Congress’s powers are explicitly enumerated, 
and its powers are further limited through the separation of powers into three 
federal branches.”).
240 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 261–62 (1839).
241 Id. at 257–58. Professor Amar has endorsed the Ex Parte Hennen view, 
arguing that if the Founders had sought to permit interbranch appointments, one 
would have expected “considerably more discussion” on the topic. Akhil Reed 
Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 808 (1999). 
242 100 U.S. 371, 398–99 (1879).
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of the government, executive or judicial, or in that particular
executive department to which the duties of such officers appertain,” 
the Court also declared that “there is no absolute requirement to this 
effect in the Constitution; and, if there were, it would be difficult in 
many cases to determine to which department an office properly 
belonged.”243 As a result, the locus of power to appoint inferior 
officers rests “in the discretion of Congress,”244 thereby preventing 
“endless controversies.”245
Although recognizing Congress’s interbranch-appointment 
power, the Supreme Court limited that power by advancing an 
ambiguous incongruity principle. The Court first noted that courts in 
past cases had properly refused to issue advisory administrative 
decisions concerning veterans’ benefits and claims against the U.S. 
Army in Florida.246 The Court then stated:
[I]n in the present case there is no such incongruity in 
the duty required as to excuse the courts from 
[appointing inferior officers]. It cannot be affirmed 
that the appointment of the officers in question could, 
with any greater propriety, and certainly not with 
equal regard to convenience, have been assigned to 
any other depositary of official power capable of 
exercising it. Neither the President, nor any head of 
department, could have been equally competent to the 
task.247
 
The Court appears to have meant that an interbranch 
appointment will be proper as long as the party defending the 
appointment demonstrates that the appointment would (1) not 
interfere with the judicial branch’s key function to resolve cases 
under Article III and (2) not rest more appropriately in the executive 
243 Id. at 397; see also Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 912–14 
(D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge panel) (saying in dicta that Siebold contradicts an 
understanding of Hennen that proscribes interbranch appointments).
244 Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
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branch based on some function of propriety, competence, and 
convenience.248
Siebold’s ambiguity was not lost on scholars or courts. Some 
observers suggested that the decision should be limited to the 
appointment of congressional-election officers (over which Congress 
has distinct powers under Article I)249 or to instances in which the 
President’s central powers were not at issue.250 But others concluded 
that Siebold imposed only minor constraints on interbranch 
appointments. For instance, a three-judge district court stated in dicta 
that the incongruity inquiry does not create “an affirmative 
requirement that the duty of the officer be related to the 
administration of justice. It is a negative requirement that the duty 
may not have ‘such incongruity’ with the judicial function as would 
void the power sought to be conferred.”251
In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court rejected an 
incongruity-based attack but otherwise failed to clarify the doctrine’s 
dimensions.252 There, the Court upheld the ability of the Special 
248 Perhaps the Court intended a narrower limiting principle. The Court 
speaks of “such incongruity.” Id. To what does “such” refer? The Court had not 
previously referred to “incongruity” in its preceding discussion, but it had referred 
to the courts’ proper refusal to provide advisory administrative opinions to the 
executive branch. Id. The Court then stated that it had a constitutional duty to 
appoint inferior officers “when required thereto by law,” and that “there is no such 
incongruity in the duty [to appoint.]” Id. Yet if the Court were merely suggesting 
that incongruity existed only when the Court was assigned a function that the 
Constitution forbade (such as providing advisory opinions), then it is unclear why 
the Court went on to discuss the propriety, efficiency, and competency of the 
appointment.
249 See Wiener, supra note 133, at 425–26.
250 See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev’d sub 
nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (“We think it must be incongruous if 
an officer of one branch is authorized to appoint an officer of another branch who 
is assigned a duty central to the constitutional role of that other branch.”); cf.
Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Politics and the 
Tenure Powers in the Court, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1159 (1988) (contending that 
Morrison rejected the understanding of the majority in In re Sealed Case).
251 Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 914 (D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge 
panel). Judge Wright, in dissent, took a more expansive view of the incongruity 
limitation. He disapproved of the judicial appointments of board-of-education 
members because such extrajudicial activities are an “unwanted diversion from 
what ought to be the judge’s exclusive focus and commitment: deciding cases.” Id.
at 923 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
252 487 U.S. 654, 659–734 (1988).
Fall 2013 Resolving the ALJ Quandary 693
Division (a specialized Article III court comprised of Article III 
judges) to appoint an independent prosecutor.253 In doing so, the 
Court held that Congress had the power to create interbranch 
appointments, subject to separation-of-powers and incongruity 
concerns mentioned in Siebold.254 The Court suggested that problems 
would arise if (1) “such [appointment] had the potential to impair the 
constitutional functions assigned to one of the branches,” and 
(2) incongruity exists between the courts’ normal functions and their 
duty to appoint.255 Under this partially redundant two-part inquiry 
(because each part looks to the courts’ functioning), the interbranch 
appointment of independent counsel was deemed not incongruous. 
The Court had earlier permitted the courts to appoint prosecutors,256
Congress sought to resolve “the conflicts of interest that could arise 
in situations when the Executive Branch is called upon to investigate 
its own high-ranking officers,”257 and Congress had rendered the 
appointing judges ineligible to participate in matters concerning the 
independent counsel.258 Of significance for present purposes, the 
Court’s analysis did not stop there. It went on to reject an argument 
that the entire statutory scheme, including its appointment provision, 
violated the separation of powers.259 Morrison is the Court’s last 
word on interbranch appointments.260
253 See id.
254 See id. at 673–76.
255 Id. at 676.
256 See id.
257 Id. at 677.
258 See id.
259 See id. at 685–96.
260 See Samahon, supra note 54, at 258–66. Professor Tuan Samahon has 
argued that if the Court’s decision in Edmond v. United States overruled 
Morrison’s test for determining who are inferior officers, “[i]t precludes 
interbranch appointments pursuant to the Excepting Clause” because usually 
officers are subordinate to those who appoint them. See id. at 267. Samahon 
recognizes, however, that lower courts have continued to reconcile Edmond and
Morrison. See id. at 258–64. Moreover, lower courts since Edmond have affirmed 
Congress’s power to create interbranch appointments. See United States v. Hilario, 
218 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Moreau, CR 07-0388 JB, 2008 
WL 4104131, at *38–39 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008).
694 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-2
3. Refining Incongruity Limitations
To bring the Court’s interbranch-appointment-power analysis 
into sharper focus, I propose ordering it into three steps. As explained 
below, these steps are consistent with interbranch-appointment 
decisions and combine Morrison’s overlapping separation-of-powers 
and incongruity inquiries into one “incongruity analysis.” The first 
step requires determining whether a significant reason for the 
interbranch appointment exists. The second step considers whether 
the interbranch appointment impedes the central functioning of the 
appointing branch, usually the judiciary. And the third step considers 
whether the appointment impedes the central function of the 
competing branch, usually the executive branch.
The first step asks whether Congress has a significant 
justification to create an interbranch appointment, such as 
minimizing conflicts of interest in the appointment of a prosecutor to 
investigate the executive branch’s high-ranking members.261 This 
justification recognizes the Court’s long-standing appreciation for 
functional concerns that lead Congress to implement interbranch 
appointments.262 At the same time, this inquiry can help to ensure 
that Congress is not unnecessarily deviating from the general “law or 
rule” in Hennen and Siebold that Congress should vest the 
appointment of an inferior officer within the “department of 
government to which the official to be appointed most appropriately 
belonged.”263 For instance, Congress would not appear to have a 
significant reason for permitting courts to appoint deputy agency 
261 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677. Another significant justification, as 
mentioned in Ex Parte Siebold, is that difficulty of telling whether a certain inferior 
officer rests within a particular branch. See Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397 
(1879). But such ambiguity, while sufficient, is not necessary because federal 
courts have upheld the interbranch appointments of U.S. Attorneys and 
independent counsel, who are plainly executive officers.
262 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677 (considering Congress’s interest in 
intrabranch conflicts of interest); Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397 (considering 
convenience of interbranch appointment and the appointing branch’s competence 
to appoint).
263 Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397 (quoting Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 
230, 258 (1839)). In a decision concerning only the separation-of-powers context 
(and not appointments), the Court spoke similarly, refusing to permit “the Judicial 
Branch . . . [to] be assigned [or] allowed ‘tasks that are more properly 
accomplished by [other] branches.’ ” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 383 
(1989). 
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heads because they are policymakers for which no conflicts of 
interest are readily apparent.
A significant justification, however, does not mean a 
necessity.264 Such a strict requirement would deprive Congress of the 
substantial discretion it has to decide how the appointment power 
should be distributed “as [it] think[s] proper” under the Excepting 
Clause.265 Indeed, if necessity were required, then the Court should
not have approved the interbranch appointments of commissioners in 
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,266 prosecutors in contempt 
proceedings in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,267
or election supervisors in Siebold.268 In short, requiring necessity 
would substantially limit Congress’s discretion that the Constitution 
expressly grants. Asking whether a significant reason undergirds an 
interbranch appointment, along with the other two steps, should 
ensure that Congress uses its interbranch-appointment-vesting 
discretion thoughtfully, not as a weapon to wound one of the other 
branches or to aggrandize its own power. Although the “significant 
justification” inquiry admittedly suffers from indefiniteness,269
limiting acceptable justifications for interbranch appointments to 
mitigating structural concerns (such as with ALJs) or ambiguities 
over the branch to which an inferior officer should be assigned (such 
as with federal marshals) is a reasonable place to start. A significant-
justification inquiry strikes the appropriate balance of respecting 
264 See Moreau, 2008 WL 4104131, at *35 (rejecting any necessity 
requirement). But see Wiener, supra note 133, at 432 (suggesting that interbranch
appointment of independent counsel was permissible because “[t]he raison d’être of 
the Independent Counsel was to create an officer not appointed by the executive 
branch”).
265 See Moreau, 2008 WL 4104131, at *35 (highlighting Congress’s broad 
direction to vest appointment power under the Excepting Clause).
266 282 U.S. 344, 354 (1931).
267 481 U.S. 787, 800 (1987).
268 Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397.
269 See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional 
Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297 (1997) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court 
should create a methodology to provide guidance on which purposes will be 
deemed “compelling” or “important” in tiered-scrutiny analysis). I have 
purposefully not used the terms “compelling,” “important,” or “legitimate” to 
describe the adequate justification; the incongruity analysis might unintentionally 
acquire the patina of the Court’s tiered-scrutiny, equal-protection analysis. See id.
at 306.
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Congress’s prerogative while ensuring that Congress does not abuse 
its discretion.270
The second and third steps relate to one another and ask 
whether the interbranch appointment undermines the central 
functioning of either the judicial or executive branches.271 In 
Morrison, the Court posed the question whether the interbranch 
appointment has the “potential to impair the constitutional functions 
assigned to one of the branches.”272 This seemingly general 
separation-of-powers inquiry has a specialized cast in the 
interbranch-appointment context, which generally concerns the 
relationship between the judicial and executive branches.273
270 Compare United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2000) (“It 
is not for the courts to determine the best or most efficient repository for a power of 
appointment vis-à-vis inferior officers. . . . Congress’s choice always deserves 
appreciable deference.”) (citing Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397–98), and Moreau, 2008 
WL 4104131, at *37 (stating that the Constitution grants Congress “considerable 
discretion”), with Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991) (suggesting that 
Congress is entitled to less deference when an interbranch appointment is at issue), 
and Ronald J. Krotoszynski, On the Danger of Wearing Two Hats: Mistretta and
Morrison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 421–23, 476–78 (1997) 
(arguing that redistributions of powers between the judicial branch and the other 
branches, as opposed to redistributions between the executive and legislative 
branches, are more suspect because judges are not politically accountable). 
Notably, Congress has not appeared to abuse its interbranch-appointment authority. 
Congress currently permits only one interbranch appointment: the district courts’ 
appointment of U.S. Attorneys in very limited circumstances. See Moreau, 2008 
WL 4104131, at *8 (quoting Wiener, supra note 133, at 363).
271 Many have criticized the central or “core executive” function inquiry 
from Morrison. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The 
President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 559–60 (1994);
Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV.
105, 105–07 (1988). My purpose here is not to propose an inquiry that is contrary 
to Supreme Court precedent; my goal is merely to refine it. Those who do not 
approve of Morrison’s formulation should rest easy with its application here. The 
Supreme Court has, so far, not again uttered or applied the standard, including in 
Free Enterprise Fund, suggesting that the Morrison standard, if not abrogated, may 
be best understood as limited to the interbranch-appointment context. 
272 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677; see also id. at 684 (asking whether the 
Ethics in Government Act threatens “the ‘impartial and independent federal 
adjudication of claims within the judicial power of the United States’ ” (quoting 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986))).
273 Other interbranch-appointment combinations are possible. For instance, 
the judiciary appoints (and removes) Article I bankruptcy judges, who are members 
of the legislative branch. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2626–27
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). But the interbranch nature of the appointment may 
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This inquiry ensures that, even with a significant purpose, an 
interbranch appointment does not impede the central functioning of 
the executive or judicial branches. After all if an interbranch 
appointment, whatever its purposes, greatly impedes one of the 
affected branches, the appointment may be unsuitable. For instance, 
after the scandal concerning the forced resignations and removals of 
U.S. Attorneys during the George W. Bush Administration,274
Congress could decide that the courts, rather than the executive 
branch, would be better stewards of the appointment and removal 
powers concerning these “ministers of justice.” Despite Congress’s 
attempt to remedy a potentially serious structural problem, 
transferring to the courts the full-time duty to appoint and remove 
U.S. Attorneys would likely impede the central functioning of the 
executive branch—to set prosecutorial policy throughout the 
country—by hindering presidential control over an important 
executive function in all districts in the United States. And the U.S. 
Attorneys’ appointment and removal by the courts could impede the 
central functioning of the judicial branch by bogging it down in 
ongoing political battles over law-enforcement policies and 
personnel. Although the existing, default appointment and removal 
scheme for U.S. Attorneys may present structural challenges, an 
interbranch appointment would likely be more problematic by 
impeding the central functioning of two branches. In other words, 
these final steps ensure that Congress doesn’t choose a cure that is 
worse than the disease.
By engaging in this three-part inquiry, courts can simplify the 
currently amorphous and redundant separation-of-powers and 
incongruity analyses. The Court’s interbranch-appointment and 
separation-of-powers analyses consider both the appointing and the 
affected branches, but in confusing and redundant ways.275 My 
be less troubling because the legislature cannot appoint under the Appointments 
Clause.
274 See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales: “Mistakes Were Made,”
WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/13/AR2007031300776 _pf.html.
275 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676. The Court’s separation of powers 
inquiry is at least partially redundant with the interbranch-appointment inquiry. The 
latter considers the effect of the appointment on both the appointing and 
nonappointing branches, and the former considers the effect of an appointment on 
either the nonappointing branch or both the nonappointing and appointing 
branches. Compare Morrison, 487 U.S. at 675 (referring to separation of powers as 
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proposed three-part inquiry, following recent lower-court opinions, 
avoids these problems by considering the effect on both branches as 
part of a compressed incongruity analysis.276
C. Propriety of Interbranch Appointments of ALJs
Interbranch appointments of ALJs should be deemed proper 
under the refined incongruity limits. Not only does a significant 
reason for the interbranch appointment of ALJs exist, but the D.C. 
Circuit’s appointments of them will not impede the central 
functioning of either the judiciary or the executive branch.
1. Significant Purpose for Interbranch Appointment of ALJs
As to the first of the three inquiries, a significant justification 
supports the interbranch appointment of ALJs: the resolution or 
mitigation of the ALJ separation-of-powers quandary. Vesting the 
D.C. Circuit with the power to appoint ALJs remedies the existing 
Appointments Clause problem by channeling ALJ appointments, in 
keeping with its text, to “Courts of Law.”277 And an interbranch 
appointment remedies, in perhaps an unconventional way, the 
existing concerns as to the proper balance of executive supervision 
and ALJ impartiality.
an “addition[al]” issue to incongruity and suggesting that separation of powers 
focuses only on the nonappointing branch), with Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361, 385, 389 (1989) (considering both the affected branch and the appointing 
branch for its separation-of-powers analysis). Thus, under either separation-of-
powers formulation, the two inquiries overlap at least in part. See Wiener, supra
note 133, at 436 & n.338; see also United States v. Moreau, No. CR 07-0388, 2008 
WL 4104131, at *17 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008).
276 See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 26–29 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(rejecting challenge to judicial appointment of U.S. Attorneys in a combined 
incongruity and separation-of-powers analysis); see also In re Sealed Case, 838 
F.2d 476, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Ginsburg, R.B., J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (“An inter-branch appointment would 
indeed fail the test of congruity if it violated the separation of powers doctrine.”). 
277 Resolving an appointments concern alone is not a significant reason for 
an interbranch appointment. Were it otherwise, Congress’s power to create 
interbranch appointments would be essentially unlimited.
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a. Mitigating Presidential-Control Concerns
With the appointment power in the D.C. Circuit’s hands, the 
President loses any constitutional power he may have had to remove 
ALJs. This counterintuitive effect arises because the power to remove 
is incident to the power to appoint, unless Congress has placed the 
removal power elsewhere.278 Courts have consistently applied this 
principle in the intrabranch-appointment context, albeit without 
significant discussion of the interbranch nature of the appointment 
and principally in the context of interbranch appointments of Article I 
or Article IV inferior officers.279 And, indeed, the judiciary currently 
has the incidental, interbranch-removal power over Article I 
bankruptcy judges.280 To be sure, in the context of judicial 
interbranch appointments of Article II inferior officers, courts have 
stressed the executive branch’s ability to remove prosecutors whom 
courts had appointed.281 But courts have never held that the executive 
branch must have the power to remove those officials, much less 
278 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010); 
Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920) (“The power to remove is, in the 
absence of statutory provision to the contrary, an incident of the power to 
appoint.”); In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 259–60 (1839) (noting that officers 
serve at the discretion of the appointing power).
279 See Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 424 (1901) (considering 
commissioners (i.e., justices of the peace in Indian Territory) appointed by judges); 
Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 913 n.13 (D.D.C. 1967) (citing In re Hennen, 
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 257–58 (1839)) (considering appointment of D.C. school-
board members); cf. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 354 & 
n.2 (1931) (upholding interbranch appointment of commissioners, with mostly 
judicial and some executive functions, and indicating that they were subordinate to 
appointing judges). The court likewise suggested the same incidental removal 
power exists with the appointment of executive-branch inferior officers, such as 
perhaps ALJs. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 126 (1926) (“[T]he power of 
appointment to executive office carries with it, as a necessary incident, the power of 
removal.” (emphasis added)); see id. at 161 (same for “inferior executive officers”).
280 See 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2006). To be precise, Congress has authorized 
the Judicial Councils—composed of Article III district and circuit judges—within 
each circuit to remove bankruptcy judges. The circuit courts themselves have only 
the appointment power under § 152.
281 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682–83 (1988) (deciding 
whether judicial power to remove an executive officer infringed upon the executive 
branch); Hilario, 218 F.3d at 27 (noting judges cannot remove interim United 
States Attorneys they appoint); United States v. Moreau, CR 07-0388, 2008 WL 
4104131, at *38–39 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008) (same).
700 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-2
have the same kind of supervisory power over officials who exercise 
only impartial, adjudicatory powers.282
Nor should courts impose any such limit by relying on Free 
Enterprise Fund. If the President or agency head permissibly lacks 
removal power, Free Enterprise Fund’s ambiguous limitation on 
tiered-tenure protections becomes inapposite by its own terms. That 
decision invalidated one of two tenure protections that limited the 
executive branch’s implied removal power. Here, only one tier of 
tenure protection exists between the D.C. Circuit and ALJs, leaving 
the President no implied removal power. Thus Free Enterprise’s 
holding does not apply. Vesting the removal power within the D.C. 
Circuit is a constitutional means of avoiding Free Enterprise Fund’s 
holding that applies to tiered-tenure protections within the executive 
branch.283
Even if Free Enterprise Fund is understood to stand more 
broadly for strongly endorsing or generally requiring the President’s 
power to remove executive officers, the rationale in Free Enterprise 
Fund does not extend to ALJs. The Court stated that the removal 
282 Although Morrison relied upon the Attorney General’s “most 
important[]” removal authority over independent counsel, see 487 U.S. at 696, the 
Court never said that such power was required. Professor Krent argues that 
Morrison determined that “some form of removal authority was constitutionally 
required.” Harold J. Krent, Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors: The Ramifications 
of Free Enterprise Fund, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2436 (2011) (referring to 
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695–96). His inference is reasonable but not compelled. In 
light of the Court’s consistent treatment of the removal power as incident to the 
appointment power and the meaningfully different functions of various inferior 
officers, a more limited interpretation of Morrison makes more sense if, as I 
attempt to do here, one seeks to reconcile the Court’s Appointments Clause 
jurisprudence. 
283 ALJs do not morph into principal officers if the D.C. Circuit, as 
opposed to an agency head, can remove them. The Court in Edmond v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997), said, “ ‘[I]nferior officers’ are officers whose 
work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by 
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” The judges of 
the D.C. Circuit, who received presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation, 
can remove ALJs under limited circumstances. And agency heads, who (in 
probably every case) were also similarly nominated and confirmed, can reverse 
ALJs’ decisions as to fact and law. Cf. Amar, supra note 241, at 807 (contending 
that subordination, not removability, is the relevant inquiry for inferior-officer 
status). The court’s significant, but limited, removal power and agency heads’ 
substantial supervision over ALJ decisionmaking would render ALJs no more than 
inferior officers. 
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power ensures that the President has the power to supervise unelected 
subordinates, not merely to persuade them “to do what they ought to 
do without persuasion.”284 But, when the government is a party to 
what is meant to be an impartial formal proceeding, the ALJ, as an 
impartial decisionmaker, should not decide in the government’s favor 
unless the government persuades it to do so. A contrary result—that 
the President can obtain a desired result from an ALJ without 
persuasion—would lead to significant due process concerns and 
undermine the very purpose of ALJs. In fact, the Court in Wiener v. 
United States upheld implicit limits on the President’s removal power 
over adjudicators by relying on Congress’s ability to render 
adjudicators “entirely free from the control or coercive influence, 
direct or indirect”285 and, as the Court said that it took for granted, 
the President’s inability to interfere with any specific adjudication.286
In short, although the President may not have to persuade an agency 
to implement a certain policy, he (or an agency) must do just that—
under the APA and under the U.S. Constitution—during formal 
administrative adjudication. The Court’s doctrine supports this 
normative view grounded in due process. Whereas removal may be a 
necessary tool for presidential supervision over policymakers,287 it
should not be necessary for presidential supervision of impartial 
adjudicators appointed by another branch.288
Finally, the lack of one form of presidential control—the 
removal power—should not be troubling, given the other forms of 
284 Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157 (2010). 
285 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1958) (quoting 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)).
286 Id. at 356.
287 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3159 (“The Commission cannot 
wield a free hand to supervise individual members if it must destroy the Board in 
order to fix it.”). 
288 But see Jeffrey A. Wertkin, A Return to First Principles: Rethinking 
ALJ Compromises, 22 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 365, 401 (2002) (stating 
prior to Free Enterprise Fund that “after-the-fact correction of a single decision 
supplies insufficient control”). I distinguish between those that perform only 
adjudicative functions, such as ALJs, and those who sometimes (or, at least, are 
permitted to) promulgate rules, such as agency heads. An interbranch appointment 
and an incidental removal of policymakers create more troubling separation-of-
powers concerns for both the executive and judicial branches. See infra Part IV.D–
E.
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executive supervision and direction.289 The executive branch, after 
all, retains a prominent place in the removal decisionmaking process 
because agencies can initiate ALJ-removal proceedings. Thus, unlike 
the proposal that granted ALJs Article III protections, my proposal 
does not suffer the infirmity of completely denuding the executive 
branch from the removal of an executive officer. As explained in Part 
IV.E, the President retains tools aside from initiating removal 
proceedings to have sufficient supervisory authority over ALJs’ 
policy decisions.290
b. Mitigating Impartiality Concerns
Judicial appointment and removal cures or mitigates the ALJ 
impartiality concerns, including the concerns that arise from 
Caperton. Because the agency is no longer “choos[ing] the judge in
[its] own cause,”291 any “probability of unfairness”292 or 
“unconstitutional ‘potential for bias’ ” should not exist under 
Caperton’s standard.293 The D.C. Circuit can also help ensure that the 
289 Professor Jonathan Entin has concluded that the removal power has 
limited actual significance, but its rhetoric and the Court’s holdings have 
significant symbolic consequences. Jonathan L. Entin, Synecdoche and the 
Presidency: The Removal Power as Symbol, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1595, 1602–
03 (1997). Perhaps, then, the Court’s formal focus on the removal power, as 
opposed to other forms of administrative control or independence, has assumed 
inflated importance. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding 
Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 30 (2010) (arguing that 
scholars should focus on practical limitations on agency independence). A 
functional approach to executive control that looks beyond the removal power 
makes the most sense in cases, such as with ALJs, where the removal power creates 
other constitutional tensions. 
290 My proposal may not satisfy unitary executive theorists because the 
President cannot remove ALJs. But those theorists’ dissatisfaction would transcend 
my particular proposal and extend to the Court’s removal-powers doctrine and any 
limits arising from due process. This doctrine has already tacitly approved of the 
interbranch-removal power, see supra note 279, and significantly limited 
presidential removal power, see generally Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3138. 
My purpose here is to provide a workable solution that accounts for both normative 
and doctrinal problems, not to challenge or provide a new normative theory of the 
President’s supervisory powers. 
291 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009). 
292 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (quoting In re Murchison, 
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
293 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 
U.S. 455, 465–66 (1971)).
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ALJs have a broad array of experiences within and outside the 
agency and thereby reduce the likelihood that ALJs come from the 
farm team that is the agency’s enforcement division with undue 
sympathy for agency-enforcement, especially highly partisan policy, 
positions. The D.C. Circuit, with careful consideration of an agency’s 
needs, will likely be more concerned than a selecting agency with
indicia of a candidate’s impartiality. As with the transfer of removal 
power to the D.C. Circuit, the transfer of appointing power enhances, 
at the very least, the perception of fairness. And, as Caperton makes 
clear, perceptions concerning impartiality matter.294
Likewise, by placing the removal decision in another branch, 
those appearing before ALJs will feel more confident that the 
executive branch—whether in the form of the President, the agency, 
or any other executive actor—is not directing the actions of a 
marionette ALJ, especially in cases in which credibility is key and an 
ALJ’s decision receives increased deference.295 That the President’s 
and agency’s actual removal power is currently very limited is 
largely beside the point. The perception that the President and agency 
have more control over ALJs than impartial courts is a powerful 
force that creates the appearance of unfairness that appears to drive, 
as Caperton makes clear, the Supreme Court’s due process inquiry. 
Vesting the removal power in the D.C. Circuit largely mitigates the 
appearance of improper agency control over ALJs.296
In short, an interbranch-appointment mechanism serves a 
significant purpose: it resolves, or at least substantially mitigates, the 
appointment, removal, and impartiality concerns that now surround 
ALJs. And it does so better than other appointment solutions under 
the Excepting Clause by way of a simple transfer of duties. For 
instance, if the President alone or a nonindependent executive 
department appointed and removed ALJs, the ALJ would have only 
one tier of tenure protection, and that good cause tenure protection 
294 See id. at 888–89 (noting that state recusal requirements for appearance 
of impropriety will limit due process challenges).
295 See Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 29–33 (explaining agency’s 
deference to ALJ credibility determinations); Timony, supra note 2, at 811–12 & 
nn.28–29 (same); supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text (same).
296 This Article does not consider whether, aside from impartiality, the 
ability of the executive branch to overrule an ALJ decision creates a due process 
problem. The Supreme Court’s decision in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 
U.S. 474, 496 (1951) (instructing lower courts to defer to agency, as opposed to 
ALJ, decisions), strongly suggests not.
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would provide the removing executive party with significant 
discretion.297 Vesting the same powers in a new or current 
independent department (whose members, because of their 
independence, the President could remove only for cause) would 
then, as now, leave the President’s removal power in jeopardy 
because two tiers of tenure protection would exist between the 
President and the ALJs. The competing concerns underlying ALJs’ 
place in the federal bureaucracy render an interbranch appointment 
appropriate and demonstrate that the executive branch is not an 
equally, much less a more, appropriate repository of the appointment 
(and thus the incidental removal) power.298
2. Judicious Appointments
Congress can use an interbranch appointment to end ALJs’ 
separation-of-powers quandary without impeding the central 
functioning of the judicial branch. Article II expressly gives the 
courts of law, if they have Congress’s blessing, the power to appoint 
inferior officers.299 The courts routinely appoint officials with solely 
adjudicatory powers—magistrate judges, special masters, and 
bankruptcy judges, for instance.300 Indeed, the courts of appeals 
themselves appoint (and have the power to remove) bankruptcy 
judges for their respective circuits, and this appointment qualifies as 
297 The default appointment mechanism of nomination and confirmation 
would likely provide ALJs additional authority within the federal bureaucracy. See
Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority Over 
Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2478 (2011) (emphasizing the
importance of Senate-confirmed appointments to agency authority). But such an 
appointment for ALJs would leave the removal power with the President, see 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119, 162 (1926) (recognizing the President’s 
incidental removal power), and thus not eradicate impartiality concerns. Thus, even 
if Congress could only use an interbranch appointment when a default appointment 
was less suitable, an interbranch appointment for ALJs would be permissible 
because it provides a more comprehensive remedy for concerns surrounding ALJs. 
Moreover, traditional appointment of sixteen hundred ALJs would be an onerous 
mode of appointment.
298 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 383 (1989) (explaining 
that the court should not perform tasks better suited to other branches); Ex Parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397 (1879) (explaining the court’s appointment power 
under Article II).
299 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
300 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 631 (2006) (authorizing court appointment of 
bankruptcy and magistrate judges, respectively).
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interbranch because bankruptcy judges are Article I judges.301 ALJs 
also adjudicate, albeit in cases in which their decisions advance the 
policies of an agency, as opposed to those of Congress, the federal 
common law, or the Constitution.302 Accordingly, granting the D.C. 
Circuit power to appoint adjudicators generally, by itself, almost 
certainly does not impede the central functioning of the judicial 
branch—that is, to decide disputes.
ALJs’ status as executive, as opposed to judicial, officers 
does not alter this conclusion. The Supreme Court has never 
invalidated an interbranch appointment; therefore, which 
appointments are inappropriate is generally unknown. But one 
recognized possibility is that an interbranch appointment is 
inappropriate when it “thrust[s] courts into partisan, political 
battles.”303 Whatever fears may exist when the judiciary appoints 
independent counsel, interim U.S. Attorneys, or other executive 
inferior officers should be absent for judicial appointment of ALJs. 
ALJs are meant to be neutrals who do not create or advocate 
particular policies, much less those identified with certain political 
parties. Indeed, if ALJ selection is currently partisan, vesting the 
appointment power in the D.C. Circuit should mitigate the 
partisanship because the D.C. Circuit, like other courts, routinely 
selects impartial adjudicators from a candidate pool. Because 
agencies themselves continue to have the power to set policy, the 
courts would not select policymakers. Instead, they would appoint 
those who have a duty to find facts and apply the agency’s 
regulations and organic acts to disputes before them. This is, at the 
301 See 28 U.S.C. § 152 (conferring authority on U.S. courts of appeals to 
appoint bankruptcy judges); Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011) 
(holding that bankruptcy courts are not “adjuncts of Article III courts”); id. at 2624 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).
302 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513–14 (1978) (stating that ALJs 
were “functionally comparable” to judges); Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1209 
(noting that ALJs do not overrule the actions of the two elected branches).
303 Wiener, supra note 133, at 426; see Amar, supra note 241, at 809 
(arguing that appointment of independent counsel “risks politicizing the 
judiciary”); Wiener, supra note 133, at 430–31 (arguing against the judicial 
appointment of U.S. Attorneys for this reason). But compare Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989) (“We do not believe . . . that the significantly 
political nature of the [U.S. Sentencing] Commission’s work renders 
unconstitutional its placement within the Judicial Branch.”), with id. at 396 (“Nor 
do the [Sentencing] Guidelines . . . involve a degree of political authority 
inappropriate for a nonpolitical Branch.”).
706 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-2
very least, a quasi-judicial function that judges understand and can 
determine with no less competence than agencies.304
The D.C. Circuit’s ability to receive comments from 
interested parties helps assuage fears of partisanship and inadequate 
information.305 Controversy arose when a judge on the Special 
Division discussed who should serve as independent counsel in the 
Whitewater Matter with Republican senators.306 As Professor Ronald 
Krotoszynski has suggested, a public notice-and-comment period 
would allow judges to obtain advice from numerous interested parties 
without resorting to ex parte contacts that could easily create the 
appearance of partisan appointments.307 These comments would be 
much like amicus briefs with which the D.C. Circuit is all too 
familiar. Receiving comments—publicly filed briefs, of sorts, from 
interested persons—helps “maintain[] the dignity of Article III 
courts”308 by allowing them to decide in a manner that is both 
familiar and transparent.
Likewise, ALJs’ status as executive officers does not 
meaningfully distinguish them from the other adjudicators (i.e., 
bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges) whom appellate courts 
currently appoint for purposes of the Exceptions Clause. Bankruptcy 
judges are Article I judges, and magistrates are Article III inferior 
officers. Unlike ALJs, who are executive officers, these other 
adjudicators cannot be reversed by the executive branch. But the 
executive branch’s ability to reverse an ALJ’s decision should not be 
troubling because that branch has the same or greater power over 
other executive officials occasionally appointed by the judiciary 
(such as U.S. Attorneys).
304 See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396 (“This is not a case in which 
judges are given power . . . in an area in which they have no special knowledge or 
expertise.” (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 676 n.13 (1988) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).
305 See Amar, supra note 241, at 809 (“Judges will not be good at picking 
prosecutors because they have inadequate information and weak incentives.”); 
Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 42 (arguing that those outside of an ALJ’s 
agency lack familiarity with that agency’s “law”).
306 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 241, at 809 (mentioning the “partisan 
bickering” resulting from the judge’s meeting); Krotoszynski, supra note 270, at 
447–55 (discussing Starr’s appointment and subsequent challenge to Judge 
Sentelle’s ex parte meeting).
307 Krotoszynski, supra note 270, at 474.
308 Id. at 475.
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The fact that ALJs, even if executive officers, are not also 
officers of an Article III court is relevant, but not dispositive. Courts 
have found it relevant, for instance, that prosecutors are not only 
executive officers, but also officers of the court.309 Yet, ALJs’ lack of 
a dual-officer capacity does not mean that interbranch appointment of 
ALJs is improper. Unlike prosecutors, who exercise purely executive 
functions (even when serving as officers of the court), ALJs exercise 
only adjudicative functions, and the courts routinely review their 
decisions. Courts’ and ALJs’ shared function gives the former the 
competence to appoint the latter. In other words, the ALJs’ similar 
function to courts more than compensates for ALJs’ lack of dual-
officer status within two branches.
Perhaps, however, appointing a large cadre of ALJs would 
require the D.C. Circuit to forsake its central function of deciding 
cases. After all, the appointment of an independent counsel, election 
supervisors, U.S. Attorneys, or even bankruptcy judges is a relatively 
rare event.310 In contrast, the federal administrative state has more 
than sixteen hundred ALJs. The large number of ALJs (almost 
double the 874 Article III judgeships311) creates the possibility that 
appointing ALJs, not deciding cases, will become a full-time job for 
the D.C. Circuit judges.
Yet, Congress can mollify this legitimate concern. The
average annual number of ALJ appointments will likely rest around 
fifty-six,312 certainly more than other interbranch appointments, but 
309 See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(describing dual role of U.S. Attorneys as officers of the court); cf. Ex Parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397 (1879) (describing dual role of federal marshals). But 
see United States v. Moreau, No. CR 07-0388 JB, 2008 WL 4104131, at *38 
(D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008) (“[An appointed U.S. Attorney] is not part of the judiciary, 
nor has he ever been.”).
310 For instance, the D.C. Circuit is charged with appointing only one 
bankruptcy judge to a fourteen-year term. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1)–(2) (2006). Even 
the elephantine Ninth Circuit must appoint only sixty-eight bankruptcy judges to 
fourteen-year terms. See id. (listing the number of judges each individual district 
must appoint). And the district courts can appoint a U.S. Attorney only if political-
appointment mechanisms have failed. See Wiener, supra note 133, at 366 
(explaining the appointment process). 
311 See Federal Judgeships, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/ FederalJudgeships.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2013) (listing 874 total Article III judgeships).
312 Although I was unable to find any statistics concerning the average 
ALJ tenure, the GAO has reported that “the ALJ program has experienced a low 
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still a manageable number. Congress can largely mitigate any burden 
on the D.C. Circuit by permitting it to appoint ALJs in three-judge 
panels.313 Assuming that the Court has nine active judges (and may 
have up to eleven active judges),314 the Court could establish at least 
three panels for each year, with each panel appointing approximately 
nineteen ALJs per year (or fewer if senior judges are permitted and 
willing to assist their active colleagues on additional panels).315 If
each appointment is treated like a decision on the merits by each
judge on the panel (meaning that each appointment is weighed more 
heavily than decisions on the merits because each appointment 
“counts” three times, one for each judge), participating in nineteen 
appointment decisions increases each active D.C. Circuit judge’s 
judge-to-merits-decision ratio, based on data from 2010, from 1:173 
to 1:192. This ratio is still significantly below the same ratio for other 
courts with relatively light caseloads (e.g., 1:242 for the Tenth 
Circuit, 1:293 for the Sixth Circuit, 1:319 for the Seventh Circuit, and 
1:415 for the First Circuit) and the national ratio of 1:459.316 Because 
annual retirement rate, ranging from 2 to 5 percent from 2002 through 2006.” 
GAO-10-14, supra note 40, at 13. For ease of discussion, I have estimated a 
retirement rate of 3.5 percent and applied that to the number of ALJs provided in 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund, rounded up to the nearest 
hundred (sixteen hundred). See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3213 
app. C (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“According to data provided by the Office of 
Personnel Management, reprinted below, there are 1,584 administrative law judges 
(ALJs) in the Federal Government.”).
313 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (permitting three-judge panels to decide cases).
314 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (permitting eleven judges on the D.C. Circuit). For 
ease of discussion, I rely on the assumption that the D.C. Circuit will have at least 
nine active judges because the D.C. Circuit had nine judges during the time period 
relevant for the data underlying the 2010 judge-to-decision ratio. 
315 The D.C. Circuit has several senior judges. See U.S. COURT OF 
APPEALS: D.C. CIRCUIT, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) 
(click on “Judges” tab to see listing of judges). If three agreed to assist with ALJ 
appointments and thereby create a fourth panel, each panel would appoint 
approximately fourteen ALJs per year.
316 See supra note 223 (documenting the caseloads of the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals). The AOC has released similar data from 2011, but this more recent data 
does not vary materially from the 2010 data and thus does not alter my conclusions 
above. U.S. Court of Appeals—Judicial Caseload Profile, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/ 
FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2011/Appeals_FCMS_Profiles_December_201
1.pdf&page=3 (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). For instance, although the 2011 relevant 
ratio for the D.C. Circuit increases from 1:173 to 1:203 (based largely on the court 
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the D.C. Circuit would continue to have the lightest caseload of all 
federal circuits even when appointing ALJs, any argument that the 
appointing of ALJs will improperly burden the D.C. Circuit “from 
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions”317 is difficult 
to accept.
Even if one disagrees with my educated guess over the 
number of appointments or its burden on the D.C. Circuit, other 
remedies exist for managing the number of appointments. Perhaps if 
ALJs reduce their average tenure or if agencies need a greater 
number of ALJs, my suggested average annual number of fifty-six 
ALJ appointments may be too low. Or appointing ALJs may be 
unduly burdensome merely because appointing would now 
potentially constitute approximately eleven percent of each active 
D.C. Circuit judge’s duties or because the D.C. Circuit’s docket is 
more time consuming and complex than I expect. If these objections 
turn out to be well founded, relatively simple solutions exist. 
Congress could allow three-judge panels within all of the federal 
circuit courts to appoint ALJs and rotate the appointing duty among 
the active judges of the circuits in random order, based on either each 
circuit’s caseload or the number of ALJs working within each circuit, 
as determined by the AOC. Although I have proposed turning to the 
D.C. Circuit based on its administrative law expertise, its location, 
and its light caseload, diluting the appointing burden throughout all 
of the federal circuit courts is another way of achieving the benefits
of an interbranch appointment without improperly impeding the D.C. 
Circuit or other “Court of Law’s” judicial function.318
having one fewer judge), the national ratio increases by an even greater degree 
from 1:459 to 1:496. 
317 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396 (1989) (quoting Nixon v. 
Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). Similarly, the AOC’s assistance 
to the D.C. Circuit should not be problematic. The Supreme Court has already 
indicated its support of the AOC’s existence and “myriad responsibilities.” Id. at 
388–89. Indeed, the AOC’s duties in administering the ALJ examination, 
compiling the agency and third-party comments, and otherwise assisting the D.C. 
Circuit ensure that the judges’ appointing of ALJs does not interfere with their 
central function of deciding cases.
318 The appointing judges are not likely to identify themselves as managers 
or employers, as opposed to adjudicators (and thereby undermine their judicial 
function). No such identification has been alleged to occur, despite judicial 
appointment of numerous other officials, including prosecutors, public defenders, 
bankruptcy judges, magistrate judges, mediators, and various clerks of court. 
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Finally, that the D.C. Circuit may review the decisions from 
ALJs that they have appointed is a virtue, not a vice. Some litigants 
and scholars have argued that an interbranch appointment is improper 
when a court sits in judgment of decisions by those it appoints, such 
as prosecutors. The appointment becomes improper, the argument 
goes, because the judiciary forsakes its appearance of impartiality.319
But this argument proves too much. Judges decide or review cases in 
which they have selected, for instance, defense counsel for the 
indigent, bankruptcy judges, magistrates, and special masters (all of 
whom could be the judges’ former law clerks) without impugning 
their impartiality.320 Therefore, it is difficult to see why their review 
of a decision by an ALJ—chosen for his or her ability to be impartial, 
not for particular policy preferences that the agency can reverse—
would be problematic, especially when the APA requires the court to 
review the decision of the agency, not the ALJ.321 Indeed, the D.C. 
Circuit’s awareness that it may have to review decisions from the 
ALJ may help provide the D.C. Circuit incentive to appoint the best 
candidates.322
319 See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(conceding judicial appointment of prosecutors could adversely affect the court’s 
impartiality); United States v. Moreau, No. CR 07-0388 JB, 2008 WL 4104131, at 
*38 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008) (examining possibility that such appointments could 
diminish the integrity of the courts); Wiener, supra note 133, at 431–32 (arguing 
judges lack impartiality and the prosecutors they appoint lack accountability). The 
Morrison Court also noted that the Special Division’s members lacked the ability to 
participate in any proceedings concerning the independent counsel that they had 
nominated. 487 U.S. 654, 683–84 (1988). But ALJs’ limited ability to make final 
policy determinations, nonpolitical role, and independence from the judiciary 
(which cannot set its jurisdiction or refer matters to the ALJ, as in Morrison)
should mitigate any concern that may arise from the D.C. Circuit’s review of ALJ 
decisions.
320 See, e.g., Hilario, 218 F.3d at 29 (referring to appointment of defense 
counsel).
321 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006).
322 See Amar, supra note 241, at 809 (arguing that judges lack incentive to 
make excellent interbranch appointments). Admittedly, the possibility of the D.C. 
Circuit reviewing a particular ALJ’s decision is slight; the other circuits review 
numerous administrative orders. Yet, the D.C. Circuit is likely to be sufficiently 
considerate to its sister courts to try to appoint impartial, well-trained ALJs. 
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3. Improved Functioning of the Executive Branch
Despite the executive branch’s loss of power to appoint and 
remove ALJs, interbranch appointment and removal do not impede 
that branch’s central functioning.323 First and foremost, agency heads 
continue to have the power to reverse an ALJ decision under the 
APA and thus control federal administrative policy.324 Agencies, too, 
continue to have discretion over matters concerning ALJs under my 
proposal. For instance, not only do they continue to decide the 
number of ALJs needed to carry out agency missions,325 but they also 
can comment on ALJ candidates and submit their own candidates for 
judicial consideration.326 Indeed, the proposed “Rule of Three or 
Four,” unlike the current “Rule of Three,” acts as a suitable substitute 
for selective certification by permitting the agency to ensure, 
especially if the “Veterans’ Preference” leads to three candidates 
without sufficient expertise, that at least one candidate has certain 
323 See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 494–95 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev’d 
sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (asking whether appointment 
undermines the President’s ability to make policy choices); see also Blumoff, supra
note 250, at 1160–61:
The requirement of some congruity also undermined the Sealed 
Case court’s ‘Chicken Little’ concern [that a limited incongruity 
principle would essentially permit the court to appoint all inferior 
officers if Congress sought to impede the executive’s 
prerogative] . . . . The Supreme Court noted that Congress could 
make no such delegation when the courts lacked special 
competence of the subject matter.
324 5 U.S.C. § 557(b); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 
495 (1951). The Supreme Court in Bowsher stated that “[o]nce an officer is 
appointed, it is only the authority that can remove him . . . that he must fear and, in 
the performance of his functions, obey.” Bowsher v. United States, 478 U.S. 714, 
726 (1986). This formulation is not entirely accurate in the interbranch-removal 
context of ALJs. ALJs will fear the D.C. Circuit judges, who can remove them 
under a heightened tenure-protection provision. But they must obey agency policies 
and general conceptions of impartial adjudication. Their refusal to do so would be 
relevant to any removal decision. 
325 See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (empowering agencies to appoint as many ALJs as 
necessary); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (considering 
Special Division’s inability to name independent counsel without AG’s request 
when approving of interbranch appointment of independent counsel).
326 See supra Part IV.A (outlining the agency’s participation in selecting 
ALJs under this proposal).
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necessary experience.327 Agencies may also seek the nearly 
immediate removal of an ALJ, on a “fast track,” if the agency can 
establish “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance.”328 And 
agencies can immediately remove an ALJ who presents a national-
security risk.329 Such abilities provide ample agency supervision over 
ALJs and the smooth functioning of the executive branch.
The transferred removal power from the executive branch to 
the D.C. Circuit—and thus the limited sharing of ALJ supervision 
between the two branches—should not trouble the executive branch
because it has, as a practical matter, lost nothing. Its removal powers 
were already substantially limited. Currently, agencies cannot simply 
remove an ALJ. Instead, they must persuade an independent agency 
(the MSPB) to remove an ALJ.330 Likewise, under my proposal, the 
agency must continue to persuade an independent entity to remove an 
ALJ. Under both the current and the proposed removal schemes, the 
President and the agency lack the ability to decide the removal 
question and the ability to influence the MSPB’s or the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision directly because of each body’s protection from removal.331
Both scenarios also provide ALJs a judicial forum. Although the 
current scenario provides deferential judicial review of the MSPB’s 
decision in the Federal Circuit,332 my proposal permits the agency to 
have speedier resolution of removal disputes because the D.C. Circuit 
decides the issue in the first instance. Moreover, even if the ALJs, as 
327 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining the “Veteran’s 
Preference” in ALJ qualification and related expertise problems under the current 
system).
328 See supra note 229 and accompanying text (explaining the standard of 
removal for ALJs); infra note 337 and accompanying text (same).
329 See supra note 231 and accompanying text (explaining immediate 
removal option).
330 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (establishing that removal of an ALJ is permissible 
“only for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection 
Board”); id. § 1202(d) (shielding members of the MSPB from the President’s at-
will removal).
331 Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3171 (2010) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (discussing the analogous inability of the President to remove 
members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board directly where the 
removal decision was vested in SEC commissioners who were themselves 
removable only for cause). 
332 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 387 nn.33 & 35 (1983) (citing 5 
U.S.C. § 7703) (highlighting that “the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the MSPB”).
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the lower-level officers in their tiered-tenure scheme, lost their tenure 
protection under a Free Enterprise Fund analysis,333 the MSPB 
would continue to have substantial tenure protection that would 
prevent direct presidential interference with the MSPB’s decision. At 
bottom, agencies would simply petition a different, albeit perhaps 
more, independent body under my proposal.
But at the same time, the proposed tenure-protection standard 
for ALJs seeks to strike the proper balance between ALJ impartiality 
and executive supervision. Although Congress intended to ensure 
ALJ impartiality with good cause tenure protection,334 the good cause 
standard has consistently been interpreted to permit removal of other 
federal officials based on insubordination.335 Such a standard 
suggests, contrary to congressional intent, that ALJs are required to 
follow agency heads’ direction on how to decide matters. Were it 
otherwise, the term “insubordination” would assume a different 
meaning for ALJs than for other federal officials, without any textual 
support for the distinction.336 The proposed “inefficiency, neglect of 
duty, and malfeasance” standard—the ubiquitous protection for 
federal adjudicators337—provides more specific grounds for removal 
than the good cause standard and thereby further constrains the 
333 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164 (declaring unconstitutional the 
two tiers of tenure protection for PCAOB members).
334 See Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131–
32, 142 (1953) (“Examiners shall be removable by the agency in which they are 
employed only for good cause established and determined by the Civil Service 
Commission (hereinafter called the Commission) after opportunity for hearing and 
upon the record thereof.”).
335 See Nagel v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 707 F.2d 1384, 1387 
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Boyle v. United States, 515 F.2d 1397, 1402 (Ct. Cl. 1975); 
Burton v. United States, 404 F.2d 365 (Ct. Cl. 1968)); see also May v. U.S. Civil 
Serv. Comm’n, 230 F. Supp. 659, 661 (W.D. La. 1963).
336 See Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321, 330–31 & n.11 
(1984) (suggesting that insubordination was a proper ground for removal of ALJs, 
but also suggesting that removal based on substantive decisions was improper); 
Barnett, supra note 117, at 1397–98 n.231. Perhaps an ALJ is charged with being 
impartial and thus cannot be insubordinate for failing to defer to the agency’s 
wishes. But even so, the vague good cause standard provides the agency much 
discretion in finding other more palatable, if insincere, grounds for removal. 
337 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (MSPB members); 10 U.S.C. § 942(c) 
(2006) (similar standard for judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces); 26 U.S.C. § 7443(f) (2006) (similar standard for tax-court judges); 28 
U.S.C. § 152(e) (2006) (similar standard for bankruptcy judges); 28 U.S.C. § 631 
(similar standard for magistrate judges).
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removing party’s discretion.338 This proposed standard would not 
permit removal based on insubordination.339 But, happily for the 
executive branch, it makes clear that inefficiency is a proper ground 
for removal that, with proper judicial interpretation, should permit 
removal based on, say, an unjustified low number of decided cases 
(as compared to other ALJs).340 Whatever minimal supervisory 
power the agency loses under the proposed removal standard as a 
practical matter, the proposed standard mitigates impartiality 
concerns that could arise under a broad reading of good cause,341
provides more specific grounds for removal,342 treats ALJs like other 
federal adjudicators (both those within and without Article III), and 
makes clear that agencies may seek removal based on an ALJ’s 
unjustified inability to control his or her docket (i.e., inefficiency).343
The complete transfer of removal power from the executive to 
the judicial branch may give one pause. After all, the Supreme Court 
in Morrison was not only troubled by the Special Division’s limited 
ability to terminate the independent counsel, but the Court also relied 
upon the Attorney General’s limited ability to remove the 
independent counsel when upholding the interbranch appointment of 
the independent counsel.344 And perhaps the executive branch’s need 
338 See Barnett, supra note 117, at 1373–82 (arguing that “good faith” 
standard is more open-ended than other removal standards and thus provides the 
removing party more discretion to decide appropriate grounds for removal); see 
also Timony, supra note 2, at 821 (referring to judicial interpretation of good cause 
as “broad and expanding”).
339 See Barnett, supra note 117, at 1373–82.
340 See generally Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989) (approving, 
in an ambiguous opinion, controversial productivity initiative for ALJs within the 
SSA). Professor Richard Pierce has opined that the productivity standard became 
toothless based on MSPB decisions and reconsideration within the SSA. See
Richard Pierce, What Should We Do About Administrative Law Judge 
Decisionmaking? 15–16 (George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law Research 
Paper No. 573, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1890770. 
341 See Timony, supra note 2, at 822 (“Such broad and amorphous 
standards may impinge on judicial independence . . . .”).
342 See id. at 824 (advocating use of clearer removal standard).
343 See id. at 826–28 (discussing removal based on low productivity).
344 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682–83 (1988); id. at 692 (“This 
is not a case in which the power to remove an executive official has been 
completely stripped from the President, thus providing no means for the President 
to ensure the ‘faithful execution’ of the laws.”); id. at 695–96 (discussing the ways 
in which the Attorney General could supervise the Independent Counsel, including 
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for the removal power is at its apex when the executive branch does 
not appoint the officer in question. Under the proposal here, the 
executive branch’s removal power is fully removed, and the judiciary 
has a more robust removal power than in Morrison.
But, in the ALJ context, the problems themselves provide the 
solutions. As previously discussed, an interbranch-appointment-and-
removal power cures the supervision and impartiality concerns in a 
manner that executive-branch removal would flout. In other contexts, 
the concerns that Congress sought to address did not require the 
transfer of the removal power. For instance, the interbranch 
appointment of the independent counsel mitigated an intrabranch 
conflict of interest in having someone appointed to investigate the 
executive branch itself, and the interbranch appointment of U.S. 
Attorneys provides a last-ditch solution to ensure prosecutorial 
continuity while the elected branches fight over a successor. But with 
ALJs, the transfer of the removal power is part of the solution.
This problem-as-solution rationale would likely be 
insufficient to justify the transfer of the removal power if it were not 
also for ALJs’ unique role within the executive branch. As previously 
mentioned, the underlying rationale of Free Enterprise Fund’s focus 
on the removal power was that the President should not be required 
to persuade executive officers. But ALJs exist to be persuaded. The 
executive branch does not need the power to remove ALJs, as 
opposed to other executive inferior officials who could make policy 
decisions, to protect its political prerogative. In short, the removal 
power is not always a necessary means of supervision. Moreover, the 
President’s ability to overturn ALJ decisions and seek an ALJ’s 
removal quickly permits him or her to have sufficient supervisory 
power to ensure the central functioning of the executive branch. 
Indeed, the lack of executive-branch removal power gives ALJs and 
the administrative bureaucracy within the executive branch an 
increased perception of impartiality and thus more public legitimacy. 
The removal power’s “talismanic” quality345 loses its mythical force 
limited, “for cause” removal power). Moreover, the majority in Free Enterprise 
Fund suggested that the President’s removal power was central to the President’s 
supervisory power. See Krent, supra note 282, at 2426, 2437 (“But, to the majority, 
the removal authority was talismanic . . . .”).
345 See Krent, supra note 282, at 2437; see also supra note 289 (referring 
to scholarship arguing that courts should focus on other indicia of administrative 
independence and executive control).
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in a purely adjudicatory context, where other methods of supervision 
can and should suffice. The executive branch, in other words, may 
completely lose the power to remove ALJs, but it still has significant 
methods of supervising and directing them.346
Finally, because the President should be deemed to have 
sufficient supervisory power over ALJs, the D.C. Circuit’s power to 
remove them should not transform ALJs into inferior Article III 
officers. Under my proposal, the executive branch and the D.C. 
Circuit, to be sure, share oversight of ALJs—the former through 
supervision of policy and the latter through its limited removal 
power. But ALJs, as between the executive and judicial branches, fit 
better within the executive branch because they help formulate 
executive policy through their initial decisions, and the executive 
branch can control that policy by reversing those decisions. The 
judiciary’s oversight is limited to removing ALJs for narrow causes 
upon others’ requests, including that of the executive branch. Indeed, 
as the Article III courts’ removal power over bankruptcy judges 
suggests,347 the judiciary’s power to remove an officer should not, by
itself, render that officer as one within Article III. In short, the D.C. 
Circuit’s limited removal power as a form of ALJ oversight does not, 
without more, render ALJs Article III officers, in light of ALJs’ 
function and greater oversight from the executive branch.
As the Court recognized in Mistretta when quoting James 
Madison:
‘Separation of powers . . . ‘d[oes] not mean that these 
[three] departments ought to have no partial agency
in, or no controul over the acts of each other,’ but 
rather ‘that where the whole power of one department 
is exercised by the same hands which possess the 
346 To be sure, the Supreme Court may take a more formal view of 
supervision by requiring, as the form of supervision, that the President have the 
power to remove subordinates. If so, my proposal would likely impede the 
President’s supervisory powers, and the quandary would remain unresolved. A 
more functional understanding of supervision is likely necessary, and not 
inconsistent with current precedent, to resolve the quandary surrounding ALJs.
347 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2627 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); id. at 2619 (holding that bankruptcy courts are not adjuncts of Article 
III courts).
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whole power of another department, the fundamental 
principles of a free constitution, are subverted.’348
 
Vesting the power to appoint and remove ALJs in an Article III court 
falls far short of vesting the whole executive power in the judiciary 
because the judiciary has no policymaking power whatsoever. The 
executive branch has the ability to make policy at every turn and 
continue “to take Care that the Laws are faithfully executed.”349
Here, as elsewhere, “constitutional principles of separated powers are 
not violated . . . by mere anomaly or innovation.”350
CONCLUSION
An interbranch appointment of ALJs is overdue. Five current 
Supreme Court Justices (two of whom are eminent administrative 
law scholars) have suggested that certain ALJs are not appointed 
properly. Four Justices have suggested that ALJs’ tiered-tenure 
protections may be invalidated in future litigation. And ALJ 
impartiality is a continued topic of discomfort for scholars, litigants, 
348 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380–81 (1989) (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 325–26 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis in 
original)). Indeed, even Justice Scalia may agree in the context of an interbranch 
appointment. The lone dissenter in Mistretta (and Morrison), Justice Scalia chided 
the majority for citing Madison for the point that the boundaries between the three 
branches were porous. He argued instead that 
[Madison’s] point was that the commingling specifically 
provided for in the structure that he and his colleagues had 
designed—the Presidential veto over legislation, the Senate’s 
confirmation of executive and judicial officers, the Senate’s 
ratification of treaties, the Congress’s power to impeach and 
remove executive and judicial officers—did not violate a proper 
understanding of separation of powers.
 
Id. at 426 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The text of the Appointments Clause permits such 
“commingling” through interbranch appointments and thus may be acceptable even 
to Justice Scalia.
349 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
350 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 385 (majority opinion). But see Va. Office for 
Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1641 (2011) (stating that lack of 
historical pedigree can indicate constitutional infirmity); accord Free Enter. Fund 
v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3159 (2010); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
905 (1997).
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and ALJs. Because of administrative uncertainty and distraction 
arising from the mere presence of those issues, Congress should not 
await judicial resolution of these troubling issues. Indeed, Congress 
has remedied past separation-of-powers problems without waiting for 
a definitive answer.351 Moreover, even if ALJs are not 
constitutionally infirm, they are not necessarily in excellent health. 
An interbranch appointment, along with relatively minor statutory 
changes to the ALJ appointment and removal scheme, can both 
mitigate potential constitutional questions and ameliorate the current 
concerns about ALJ impartiality.
Key constituencies, such as federal agencies, have good 
reasons to support my proposal. For instance, despite losing the 
ability to select ALJs under my proposal, agencies would gain a way 
around the Rule of Three by obtaining the ability to nominate their 
own candidates if they are unsatisfied with the three original 
candidates. Because it is likely that the D.C. Circuit, in interests of 
comity, will carefully consider the agencies’ views and proffered 
candidates, the agencies may actually prefer to exchange the power 
to select for the power to nominate. The agencies would also retain 
the power to seek removal of ALJs. Under either the current or 
proposed scheme, they must convince an independent body to 
remove ALJs. And, to mollify their expressed concerns over the 
protracted nature of ALJ-removal proceedings, agencies would 
receive swifter resolution of ALJ-removal proceedings because of the 
direct filing of an action with the D.C. Circuit.352
351 After Professor John Duffy noted that the appointment of certain 
administrative judges for the Board of Patent Appeals was very likely 
unconstitutional, Congress altered those judges’ mode of appointment without 
awaiting a judicial determination concerning those appointments. See John F. 
Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 904, 904 n.*, 918 n.72 (2009) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2006) (as amended Aug. 
2008)).
352 Given agencies’ reduced control over ALJs, as compared to other 
agency employees, agencies have turned to rulemaking and non-ALJ hearing 
officers when possible. See Wertkin, supra note 288, at 397–99, n.157 (citing 
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10 
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65, 70 (1996) (stating that non-ALJs are “sprouting faster than 
tulips in Holland”)). Because agencies are in essentially the same, if not an 
improved, position under my proposal as they are currently, an interbranch 
appointment will likely not alter the agencies’ turning away from ALJs. The issue, 
instead, concerns when Congress should require formal adjudication under the 
APA.
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Likewise, ALJs should support an interbranch-appointment 
solution. Despite failing to obtain Article III protections and status, 
they do receive clarified tenure protection that is suited to their 
adjudicative function, and they obtain more perceived and actual 
indicia of independence. An independent branch’s appointment and 
removal of ALJs should help balance the ALJs’ pro-agency bias that 
is said to develop and help link the administrative adjudicators with 
their deified judicial counterparts. No longer will a party to formal 
agency proceedings be the appointing and removing power.
Even the D.C. Circuit judges have reason to support the 
interbranch-appointment proposal. The D.C. Circuit has not been 
fully staffed in more than a decade, in part because of the general 
perception that the court is not sufficiently busy to require the 
number of active judges that the court is permitted to have353 and 
because of the politicization of appointments to the “second most 
important court” in the country, from which several recent Supreme 
Court Justices have been elevated.354 Vesting the appointment and 
removal power in the D.C. Circuit may mitigate both concerns. 
Proponents of having a full complement of D.C. Circuit judges could 
point to the court’s increased duties to compensate for its low number 
of decisions. And they could point to the court’s administrative role 
in protecting formal executive adjudication—by selecting neutral 
adjudicators355—as a means of emphasizing the court’s important 
and necessary place in the judiciary and the administrative state, and 
de-emphasizing the court’s unofficial status as a junior-varsity 
Supreme Court.
More broadly, my proposal demonstrates the potential for 
interbranch appointments to solve structural concerns with the 
modern administrative state. The clarified and simplified incongruity 
analysis that I have proposed is consistent with interbranch-
appointment jurisprudence and perhaps may render interbranch 
appointment a helpful tool for Congress to remedy as-of-yet 
unidentified, future separation-of-powers conundrums. Congress, 
353 See Bloch & Ginsburg, supra note 223, at 562 n.63 (discussing 
Congress’s questioning of whether the D.C. Circuit was sufficiently busy to require 
twelve judges). 
354 Carl Tobias, The Urgent Need to Fill The Current D.C. Circuit 
Vacancies, JUSTICA.COM (Nov. 14, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/11/14/the-
urgent-need-to-fill-the-current-d-c-circuit-vacancies.
355 See supra Part IV.C.2.
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thereby, can improve the fairness, both actual and perceived, in the 
governing structures that it creates.
***
In closing, one final series of questions emerges: Should 
scholars, including me, bother considering solutions for these mostly 
formalist problems, largely arising from questionable Supreme Court 
precedent? For instance, does it really matter, as a functional matter, 
who appoints ALJs, when these ALJs may have lunch or chat around 
the water cooler with other employees within the agency, or when the 
agency can generally overrule all ALJ decisions anyway? Or, for 
example, should we concern ourselves with a removal-power 
doctrine that appears to invalidate tiered-tenure protection although 
one tier of tenure protection can substantially limit the President’s 
control over the administrative state? Similarly, should we worry 
about independence and impartiality issues that are largely grounded 
on appearances of impropriety and perhaps merely theoretical effects 
of an agency’s appointment and initiation of removal? Indeed, should 
we address the Court’s current formalist separation-of-powers 
doctrines at all in light of its historical fluctuation between formalism 
and functionalism?
In short, the answer to these questions—all of which, at 
bottom, ask whether current doctrine that largely eschews 
functionalism for formalism should matter to normative reforms—is 
yes. Separation-of-powers scholars often seek to reshape or 
reconsider separation of powers.356 Although such work has its place, 
the purpose of this Article is to move beyond the mere normative 
issues and instead define the problems and answers within the 
doctrinal construct that the Court has provided. Doctrine, for better or 
worse, matters for practicing lawyers and judges, and I seek to 
persuade scholars, practitioners, and Congress that my statutory 
solution is a serious option to consider in resolving a multifaceted 
problem.
Formalities can often matter both substantively and 
practically. For instance, the Court has repeatedly held that the 
vesting of the appointment power is not mere “etiquette or 
356 See Barkow, supra note 289, at 16 n.2 (referring to the “vast literature” 
on separation of powers and agency independence).
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protocol.”357 Instead, the appointing formalities are express, specific 
requirements in the Constitution meant to act as a bulwark for 
democratic government.358 But formalism, as with the Court’s 
removal-powers jurisprudence can potentially have significant, 
disruptive effects on the federal administrative state.359 The proposed 
solution here respects the substantive underpinnings, as well as limits 
the disruptive effects, of the Court’s formalist doctrines.
Whether one supports or disfavors the Court’s formalism 
normatively, one cannot simply ignore the doctrine or wish for its 
demise. The Court has taken a decidedly formalist turn in its 
separation-of-powers jurisprudence for nearly twenty-five years. For 
instance, the Court has relied upon a more formal definition of 
“inferior officer,”360 settled upon a new two-part definition of 
“department,”361 eschewed a functional understanding of the 
President’s removal powers that four dissenting Justices would have 
adopted,362 and likely returned to more formal limits on removing 
disputes from Article III courts.363 In light of these decisions and the 
lack of functional counterexamples since 1988’s Morrison v. Olson,
the Court’s formal doctrines are not a mere fad, but instead a 
conscious jurisprudential turn that scholars ignore at their peril. 
These formal doctrines create, in part, the tripartite quandary that I 
discuss here, and a solution becomes difficult because functional 
concerns lose much of their salience. One must, therefore, confront 
the doctrine on its own terms, seek a formal solution to a largely 
formal problem, and—in the process—seek to suggest ways to soften 
the edges or unintended consequences of the formalist doctrine with 
permissible functional considerations. Here, I have proposed a formal 
interbranch-appointment-and-removal mechanism that seeks to 
address the formal problems of executive adjudication and account 
for some functional avenues where the Court’s decisions permit.
357 See, e.g., Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (quoting 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)).
358 Id.
359 See generally Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3177–82 
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the potential consequences of the Court’s 
ruling on the double for-cause removal clause at issue).
360 See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–64 (1997).
361 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163.
362 See id. at 3167–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
363 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608–09, 2620 (2011).
722 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-2
Finally, statutory proposals, such as the one that I have 
proposed here that seeks to dull the edges of the Court’s formalism, 
reduce the real possibility of the Court creating even more 
uncertainty in the law to account for the problems that its formal 
doctrines create. The Court’s separation-of-powers doctrines are 
notoriously hard to reconcile, often lacking any theoretical 
consistency.364 The Court may be tempted to decide cases in ways 
that avoid disruptive outcomes at the expense of whatever doctrinal 
coherence exists. My statutory solution is meant to avoid such 
decisions. Perhaps paradoxically, the Court’s formal, inconsistent 
doctrines may have ultimately provided an impetus for solving both 
formal and functional problems that have long plagued formal 
administrative adjudication. And this solution may, as a consequence, 
give ALJs some of the deification that they have long craved.
364 See Barnett, supra note 117, at 1350.
